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The objective of this thesis is to develop an analysis of El Salvador's economy
using available statistical data.
First, an examination is made of El Salvador's democratization process in a
historical perspective. Second, an analysis is undertaken of the country's policy through
historical budget allocations. Third, an assessment is made of the economic standing
point of El Salvador. This discussion embraces the production sectors, to determine their
strengths and weaknesses from the resources efficiency point of view. Fourth, the study
analyzes the implications of El Salvador's increasing trade deficit from the efficiency and
equity perspectives. Fifth, a presentation is made of the economic strengths, weaknesses,
threats and opportunities of the country from the short and long run perspective.
Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made which could be utilized
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El Salvador is a 6,020 sq. mi. country located in Central America which inherited an
agricultural export economy from its colonial past. In the early years, this style of production
was probably enough to satisfy the population's needs. With a growth rate of 3.2% annually,
however, the population has grown to approximately 6,000,000 people today. This growth,
combined with a lack of natural resources, low capital and technological investment, persistent
political instability, and an ever-increasing trade deficit has lowered the Salvadoran standard of
living. Social dissatisfaction provoked a civil war that lasted 12 years (1979-1991), destroyed the
most of the country's infrastructure, and created even more social problems. Furthermore, the
trade pattern has induced several negative economic effects, among which a trade deficit and bad
income distribution seem to be the most harmful.
During the 1980's, the government imposed several measures (subsidies, quotas and
tariffs) in an effort to balance the trade with other countries. This decade was also marred by
civil war. These two factors combined to severely affect the economy and trade.
After 1986, the government liberalized the economic system to move toward the
implementation of a free market system (three years before the end of the war). The trade deficit
responded with an increasing trend, while interest and foreign exchange rates seemed to be
stabilizing. Unfortunately, the Salvadoran standard of living has deteriorated to even lower
levels than those experienced during the war.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a diagnosis of the Salvadoran economy using
techniques from the fields of comparative economics, microeconomics, and policy analysis. In
relevant courses at the Naval Postgraduate School, the literature was observed to contain many
case studies of countries that have "extricated" themselves from underdevelopment. Most of
these countries have natural resources and some level of technological capability or the economic
muscle to obtain it. There are few studies of "third world" countries that lack economic
capacity, technology, and natural resources to develop, as is the case in El Salvador. It is hoped
that this investigation into causes, consequences, and possible cures for the Salvadoran economy
will, therefore, contribute to an understanding of the issues involved.
Chapter II examines El Salvador's democratization process from a historical perspective.
Chapter EQ analyzes the country's budgetary priorities as evidenced in allocations from 1900 to
1995. The goal of the chapter is to present the evolution of the national interest over different
administrations, as well as summarize of the resulting economic effects. The analysis is divided
into three periods of study related to the Salvadoran civil war: the pre-war, wartime and post-war
periods.
Chapter IV ascertains El Salvador's economic standing. The principle factors analyzed
include real GPD data and social and economic indicators related to production information.
Viewed over time, these indicators provide insight into economic trends in El Salvador. The
discussion also examines the production sectors to determine their strengths and weaknesses
from a resources efficiency point of view.
Chapter V analyzes the implications of El Salvador's increasing trade deficit from the
perspectives of efficiency and equity. This analysis was based on trade information obtained from
national and international sources. The objective was to examine the country's comparative
advantages, welfare benefits from trade, and how trade patterns affect El Salvador's economy.
Chapter VI examines the future of El Salvador's economy. Discussion of possible
directions is based on the information presented in previous chapters, and occurs in light of the
economic strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities presented by the current economic
situation.
Chapter VII offers conclusions and recommendations, including discussion of a number
of short and long term policy considerations that could positively affect El Salvador's economic
future.
Throughout this thesis, the starting point for empirical analysis is the raw data obtained
from Salvadoran and international sources. From time to time, however, the reader may note
assumptions which are intended to simplify the problem or to facilitate the readers interpretation
of the analysis.

II. THE SALVADORAN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
The present chapter will examine El Salvador's democratization process. The analysis
develops an understanding of the type of society and a comprehension of the historical leadership
styles and their socio-political consequences. For any country, the development of economic
opportunities for the future is dependent on long term political stability. It will, therefore, be
useful to examine the level of political stability in El Salvador.
In the New World order, political stability can be measured by the degree of practiced
democracy. However, in the case of El Salvador, democracy is the result of a long process that is
still ongoing. Hence, the approach of the analysis will be to determine expected political stability
in the context of the democratization process.
A. ORIGINS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE
During colonial times, Spain was the country's only trading partner. El Salvador was
essentially a slave society with a single agricultural export: indigo. After emancipation took
place on the 15th of September, 1821, a government was established by the "Criollo" leaders of
the independence movement, who opened market relations with the United States. Later, with
the development of synthetic colorants for clothes, production of indigo was no longer profitable.
Coffee, which had been introduced in the 19th century, became the main export crop.
The elite level of society controlled all production and trade, and therefore exclusivly
represented the commercial interests of El Salvador in the international marketplace. The
government existed to represent these same interests, and the resulting investment opportunities
presented to international corporations did much to overcome the country's dependence on
agriculture.
The power of the elite was the product of its ownership and control of land, capital and
commerce. Its political power was inseparable from and existed to preserve this economic
domination. The Army was expected to play a supportive but subordinate role in maintaining the
existing political and economic structure.
Popular discontent and protest was the inevitable product of such conditions. These were
expressed in innumerable episodes of violence on the part of individuals and small groups, and
significantly large and frequent peasant uprisings. Such protests were met by increased
repression.
B. THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
In the early 1930's, against the background of a worldwide depression, there was a
superficial shift of power from the elite to the Army. For the next fifty years, a series of military
dictatorships installed by the elite would control the country.
El Salvador, along with other countries in Central America, began modernizing its social
structures in the 1930's. Inequalities based on social privileges from colonial times were no
longer fashionable. Fundamentally, however, the conservation of income by the wealthy elite
continued unchanged, and remains a key social, economic, and political issue to this day.
Beyond excessive concentration of wealth, however, the political control exercised by the elite
developed a single agricultural export and a continued dependency on imported manufactured
goods. The lack of industrial development insured that the prevailing situation mirrored that
inherited from colonialism, with the result that movement on the social ladder was virtually
impossible.
After World War II, the military leaders of El Salvador began to promote change in the
economic policy. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the single agricultrual crop would
not support the necessary infrastructure for industrialization, which had become a necessity in the
political climate of Central America and in the economic climate of the world. What made
additional development possible at this time was the high international price of the coffee in the
post-war period, combined with an increase in coffee production that catapulted El Salvador to
prominance as one of the largest coffee producers in the world. The direct results of these two
factors were the expansion of the domestic market and a sharp increase in government revenues.
While this presented an immediately attractive situtation to the leadership, they were
acutely aware that the reliance on a single agricultural export had produced a very unstable
income situation; variations of price in the external market, and the unreliability of weather
conditions seriously eroded the ability of the country to support continuous growth through
agriculture. The decision was made to begin investing in the country's industrial capacity, and
that meant it would be necessary to establish sufficient infrastructure to support industrial
expansion.
The first step was to diversify the country's agricultural export products by developing
new export crops (most notably cotton and sugar). The government began to invest in roads,
water supplies, and power plants. These initial efforts were relatively successful, and by 1970's
the economic and social structure of El Salvador had been transformed in fundamental ways.
Military dictatorships continued to rule the country, but as developmentalists ostensibly oriented
toward a limited style of democratization. Some signs of progress were that unions and political
parties were allowed to organize in the cities. In 1964, opposition representatives occupied seats
in the national legislature. These developments in democratization were based on
recommendations by the Economic Commission for Latin America.
The infrastructure created in the earliest stages of development began to produce results
between 1960 and 1970. Industry grew at an amazing pace, reaching rates of 8.1% per year
(North, 1985, p. 43). This change also lead to urbanization. In 1971, 34% of the population
lived in the cities, in contrast to 26% in 1950.
The new economic policy transformed the country's social structure. The prosperous
middle and upper classes together made up 13.6% of the population by 1970. An industrial
working class comprising 11.1% of the population emerged in the urban centers. At the same
time, however, 75.3% of the population lived under survival conditions.
In commercial terms, the diversification of export products was successful, but it used all
of the country's arable land. The crops promoted by the government required cultivation by rural
workers, but only on a seasonal basis. The exclusive use of the land, and the intermittant demand
for large numbers of laborers, meant that both land and work were denied to the rural population.
The drop in food crop production resulting from a lack of available land coincided with the
century's most rapid population growth. 1 These events induced severe hardship for the rural
population, and created a national dependence on food imports.
These factors combined with frustration over an inefficient welfare system, the
ineffectiveness minimum wage legislation, and the lopsided distribution of income led many
'According to statistical information, in 1948 the total country population was 2,047,000, but up to 1970 the population was
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Salvadorans to voice their discontent. The immediate option for many Salvadoran peasants was
migration toward Honduras and the United States, for political as well as economic reasons.
While unions and political organizations were allowed, those that were out of favor were
ruthlessly repressed; the search for a political voice was necessarily one beyond the nation's
borders.
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF AUTHORITARIANISM
In 1969, 130,000 of the 300,000 Salvadorans living in Honduras were forcefully expelled
from that country to return home as refugees. On July 14, 1969, the Salvadoran army invaded
Honduras in an effort to stop the ongoing abuse of human rights. The increased demand on El
Salvador's industry to provide jobs resulted in rising unemployment levels.
During the 1970's the opposition political parties and the Catholic church promulgated
agrarian reform and the rights of the peasants. Popular discontent was manifested throughout the
70's, making foreign investment unstable; foreign capital outflow from the country led to a
worsening economic picture. Though promised, agrarian reform never took place, and the last
opportunity to stabilize the country was lost.
On October 15, 1979 a military coup took place and an apparently reformist civil military
junta was established. On January 3, 1980, several internationally respected civilians in the
October Junta found that they were to have a purely ornamental role in a government intended to
camouflage continuing repression. Unable to control the armed forces or to persuade the landed
class to accept necessary reforms, specifically, genuine agrarian reform and power sharing with
the country's popular organizations, they resigned. The social problems of the country had been
already 4,500,000 inhabitants.
used for the communist leaders to organize the peasants, and El Salvador's revolution was
imminent.
D. THE CHAOS OF THE POWER VACUUM
The centralized state system imposed during the 1980's, after the removal of a military
dictatorship, launched agrarian reform as a quick political solution to the social problems created
by the elite mono-cultivist society. This was done without a deeply thought out plan. It further
damaged the country's already weak economy of the country and brought more social problems
to the new government junta.
From 1979 to 1980, the Government nationalized the financial system, the export
agriculture industry, the services sector, and the agricultural industry. The state regulated the
economy, and implemented an extensive subsidy policy.
The country's problems during the 1980's were complicated by a popular rebellion that
lasted twelve years. During this period, most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed, and
almost all the economic activities disappeared.
The manufacturing sector remaining in the country was protected by the government by
eliminating taxes and extending preferential long term credits. The nationalized factories,
however, were decreasing production while expenses were increasing, which led to a non
profitable manufacturing sector. The following years saw repeated attempts to prevent the
communist rebels from taking over the government by force. Democratic solutions were difficult
in the power vacuum created since the coup. The social crisis had gone beyond the political
arena. The majority of both the government and the rebel leadership was corrupted. Corrupt
interests obstructed peace negotiations, while thousands of lives were lost every day.
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From 1985 to 1988, the Salvadoran government continued fighting the guerrillas without
positive results. The major change in the political landscape of this period was the presence of
decisive support from the United States. This support did little more, however, than reinforce the
non-productive strategy of confrontation; the external vision to solve the problem was "guns
instead of attempting to attack the causes and search for a rational solution to democratization."
Finally, on the 16th of February of 1992, a peace agreement was signed ending 12 years
of civil war. President Alfredo Christiani, a member of the upper class who was elected in 1986,
was the one who spearheaded the peace process. From that starting point, El Salvador obtained
significant political, economic and social improvements, including the subordination of the
Armed Forces to civilian authority.
In 1994 the second transparent elections took place; this time under more peaceful
circumstances. The Christian Democratic party, the ruling party during most of the wartime
period, obtained only 10% of the vote. This result could be interpreted as the people's response to
the party's (Democratic) past history of ineffective and corrupt administration. The Communist
Coalition obtained 33% of the vote. The winner, with 44% of the electorate, was Armando
Calderon Sol, a member of the conservative party, who benefited from the good management of
his predecessor, Alfredo Christiani. Significantly, this election marked a loss of unity in the
Communist coalition; hardline communist groups were separated from the centralist ones.
E. DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR TODAY
The democratic process in El Salvador is still evolving. Institutional inefficiency provides
a focus of attention for the forces opposed to democracy, thanks to the incompetence of both the
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government and political parties. The current political climate is defined by the following
destabilizing trends (Central American University, 1995) :
•
•
The Government has faced difficulty in addressing the needs of demobilized soldiers
and former guerrillas, who have taken their protests to the streets; some radical groups
threatened to take up arms again.
There are limitations to the credit, training and technical assistance available for the
government's land transfer program, which is a potential for more social disorder.
The rise of organized and unorganized crime have led some people, in desperation, to
call for the return of the armed forces, which in turn feeds a level of paranioa among
the former rebels.
In attempting to cope with the most evident problem in government, a lack of funds,
direct individual taxes have been increased from 10% to 13%. This move made the
government unpopular.
Democracy in El Salvador is in a fragile state because its political institutions have not
been able to define and solve the specific causes of instability. Implementation of the solutions
to these problems will also require considerable levels of finance. There are insufficient internal
resources to pay the bill for twelve years of civil war. During the war, international military aid
was forthcoming for both warring groups especially from Washington, together with UN
promises of economic assistance in the post war period. None of the promised economic
assistance is being delivered. The results of this scenario are painfully felt by the ordinary
Salvadoran, who would note that democracy cannot be achieved on an "empty stomach".
Simply put, short term political stability depends on El Salvador's ability to obtain
external economic assistance. Long term stability, however, can only be achieved through
successfully managing the country's economic policy in light of the limited natural resources.
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This chapter has discussed the social origins of the country, its political evolution, and the
level of the nation's political stability. The next chapter presents an historical analysis of El
Salvador's budgetary expenditures. The objective is to determine what level of economic
development has been dictated to pursue the country's national interest.
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III. EL SALVADOR'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND ITS EFFECTS ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This chapter determines El Salvador's historical national interest and the resulting state of
development in the country. To accomplish this objective, El Salvador's budget allocations from
1965 to 1995 will be analyzed. Budget information for 1976 to 1995 is presented in Appendix
A, and is divided into two major variables; national defense and national development (these two
components are presented independently in Appendix B). The analysis will be enhanced by
using historical information on the relevant events to illustrate the country's situation in the
period under study. Economic effects will be extrapolated from economic and social indicators
of the period.
A. LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT
In order to facilitate the analysis it is necessary to define the possible levels of
development from which El Salvador as any other country could seek its national objectives. For
this reason six categories of development will be defined upon which a country could orient its
national interest. These levels are defined in the following subsections.
1. Non-Developed
This status will be defined as the basic level at which a country can be considered as a
nation. In other words, the only assets acquired are population, territory and certain level of
sovereignty, with an undefined government structure. The majority of inhabitants are not able to
satisfy their physiological needs.
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2. Under-Developed
This status will have additional assets to those found in a non-developed nation: a
defined government structure, basic infrastructure consistent with limited utilities (water and
electrical energy), health care, elementary education, primary and secondary roads, urban and
rural collective transportation, basic international communication system (ports, airports and
railroads). The majority of inhabitants of the country have satisfied their basic physiological
needs.
3. Developing
This is a status of transition that is very difficult to define, because while some political,
economic and social sectors have reached acceptable levels of development, others sectors are
stagnant. The country has reached an adequate level of political stability, and is able to generate
enough resources to carry out economic and social plans to meet good standards of infrastructure
for growth toward development. This stage is the most difficult for a country to pass, and
depending on the political stability and on the resources available a country can suffer stagnation,
or even worse, it can suffer from a cyclical movement between this stage and the under-
developed status. The investment in human capital becomes a medullar issue in the government
policy. The inhabitants of the country can have an erratic improvement in their self-esteem.
4. Developed
Developed nations are those that have maximized their assets under their resource
constraints. They have the ability to decide their destiny as autonomous countries. Some of the
characteristics of this status are a healthy economy and long run political stability. The majority
of the inhabitants have reached a level of self actualization.
16
5. Core
The difference between a core nation and a developed nation is that the core nation is not
only autonomous, but also able to exercise influence among other countries in seeking its own
interest. The inhabitants do not differ much from inhabitants of developed countries.
6. Power
These countries are the ones that are able to direct the world order toward their own
interests. This results in having influence over groups of nations and regions.
It is obvious that not all countries are able to progress through all the stages, because
progress will be subject to the resource capabilities of each individual country. Nevertheless,
each country will try to maximize their development level given their resource constraints.
B. SALVADORAN NATIONAL INTEREST
1. 1900-1950
Budgetary figures tell the history of a government's intentions over a specific period.
Table 1 presents El Salvador's budget allocations separated into two historical periods. The first
period is from 1900 (78 years after emancipation) to 1933, the year after the oligarchical
government ended. The second period, from 1934 to 1948, occured during the governance of
authoritarian regimes.
It is interesting to note that during the 35 years of the first period, defense allocations
averaged 21% of total expenditures, almost 8% higher than in the following period. Some of this
large investment can be attributed to the need for building up the army due to the external threats.
The Salvadoran Army fought in 27 battles after its independence; against Mexico, Guatemala,
Nicaragua and Honduras, and also fought against the filibuster William Walker. Another reason
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was the need for internal security due to the repressive styles of governments established after the
colonial period, where force was used against the native americans.
Table 1. Salvadoran Budget Allocations as a Percentage of Total Expenditures: 1900-
1948.
(Source: Wallach and Adler, 1951)
Period
_—.
Defense Development Debt Service
1900-1933 21.8% 51.7% 26.5%
1934-1948 15.0% 75.9% 9.1%
Debt servicing during the first period was almost three times higher than during the
second period. The great difference in these levels of expenditure has several causes. During the
first period, several external long term loans were granted to El Salvador, particularly in 1922.
These loans were used to develop the agricultural export infrastructure and thereby improve the
economy. The drastic reduction of the debt service in the second period can be attributed to two
primary causes: 1) From 1939 to 1944 service of the long term foreign loans was suspended, and
2) the terms of the long term debt agreements were renegotiated afterward.
From 1900 to 1933, development expenditures were represented by debt service.
Therefore, to analyze the development priorities, this budget category has been broken down into
general management, cultural and social expenditures, and economic development. Their shares
will be expesed as a percent of the total development expenditures (see Table 2).
18
Table 2. Salvadoran Development Expenditures: 1900-1948.







1900-1933 57.3% 18.0% 24.7%
1934-1948 50.2% 23.4% 26.4%
There seems to be less interest in human capital and social investments in the first period
than in the second, when the authoritarian regimes ruled the country. The difference is not of a
magnitude to indicate a decisive intention to change the orientation of Salvadoran development.
It appears that the difference can be attributed to the military taking advantage of the debt service
reduction to increase other expenditures. Hence there is no sustantial difference in the allocation
priorities between the two periods.
2. Pre-War Period (1965-1978)
During this period El Salvador could be considered to be under-developed. The
government was a dictatorship established by the ruling class; the orientation of the national
interest is shown by the budget allocation of 18.03% for national defense. The probable reason
for this allocation was the instability of relations with the neighboring country of Honduras. Poor
border delimitation and the commercial trade patterns that favored El Salvador were issues of
conflict. Internal political instability was not only evidenced by multiple changes in government,
but also by the exodus of Salvadoran peasants to United States and Honduras in search of
improved living conditions. At this time, however, 81.96% of the budget was devoted to
creating an urban educational infrastructure, and to start a new health care system for the
industrial class. In 1969 the so-called "Soccer War" took place between El Salvador and
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Honduras. Because of this war, half of the Salvadorans peasants living in Honduras were
returned to their country as refugees; worsening the social and economical climate in El
Salvador. In 1970, the budget allocations indicate 16.4% for defense and 77.20% for
development. Both reductions in investment resulted from the budgetary compromises to
support defense spending during the pre-soccer war period. The government continued to focus
on solving basic urban infrastructure problems, while the rural population, accounting for 75% of
the total, was not able to meet even the most elementary social needs. It appears that during this
period El Salvador's national interest was focused on the demands of urban minorities and
responding to external threats.
From 1971 to 1978, El Salvador continued to stagnate as an under-developed country.
Internal political and social problems were getting worse. Electoral fraud, in 1972, accelerated
the radicalization of groups among society. The government's inability to accurately guage the
threat of dissatisfaction to internal political stability is evidenced by the low defense budget
allocations of the period; had the leadership realized the seriousness of the situation, there would
have been a more substantial effort to fund security forces to maintain internal order.
From 1976 to 1978, budget allocations for national defense increased by insignificant
amounts, considering the level of the internal threat. Defense spending moved from 9.06% to
1 1 .72% of the total budget. The oligarchy ignored the social needs of the people, whether as a
result of the impression that the people were submissive, or of a single-minded pursuit of profit.
The government kept trying to solve the social problems with "band aid" solutions. Budget
allocations reflect this strategy; from 1976 to 1978 the investment in development was slowly
dropping from 85.6% to 82.9% of the total budget allocation. The principal effort was made in
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long term investment in education, health care, and improvements of the economic infrastructure.
Hydroelectric plants, a new airport, highways, school buildings, health care units, and recreation
facilities were constructed during this period. However, these actions, that were viewed by many
as a last opportunity to make positive gains among the population, became parts of a failed
strategy when yet another military dictatorship was imposed in 1977. In this period, promised
agrarian reform never took place, and came to be seen as a convenient measure to maintain the
power of the elite. The national interest was again to defend the interest of a few over the
interest of the majority.
3. Wartime Period (1979-1984)
In 1979 a military coup took place. This coincided with a consolidation of leadership
among the communist groups. With the principal players in place, everything was ready for civil
war, which was not long in coming.
The neighboring country of Nicaragua fell to communist rule in June of 1979, after a
short rebellion. This event would play an important part in launching the attempted communist
revolution in El Salvador. In 1981, the first major offensive by communist guerrilla forces took
place in the most important urban areas of the country, but proved unsuccessful. The first
elections for legislative seats and municipality heads took place in 1982, and in 1984 Napoleon
Duarte was elected President of the Republic in a questionable election. The following years saw
a government policy that essentially amounted to an ongoing attempt to prevent the communist
rebels from taking over the government by force.
Increasing national defense budget allocations, from 11.6% in 1979 to 25.2% in 1984,
demonstrate clearly the government's objective: to stop the communist movement. On the other
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hand, the drastic reduction in national development expenditures, from 82.5% in 1979 to 54.8%
in 1984, were used to subsidize the physiological necessities of the population and to sustain the
nationalized agricultural industry and the remaining economic infrastructure.
From the analysis it can be concluded that El Salvador's national interest was oriented
toward solving internal instability problems through action in the political, economic, social, and
national defense arenas.
From 1985 to 1988, El Salvador's government kept fighting the guerrillas, with no
positive end to the conflict in sight. The main difference during this period was the decisive
support of the Reagan Administration and the change of US strategy with regard to Central
America. The United States altered its view after the Carter Administration's policies failed to
prevent the spread of communism in Central America, as evidenced by the communist takeover
in Nicaragua. The firm intentions of the Reagan Administration left little room for
interpretation: "....This tiny country where President Reagan said he was drawing the line against
communism is the target of the most sophisticated counterinsurgency war ever directed by
Washington... " (Barry and Preusch)
The budget allocations during this period were relatively stable, averaging 29% for
national defense and 53% for economic development. This information reflects the influence of
US aid, because the level of expenditures maintained an almost constant trend, in spite of the
dismal outlook of the military situation and the fact that the country's infrastructure was almost
completely destroyed. The war involved very sophisticated levels of engagement, and the
combat readiness of the Armed Forces improved compared to the start of the conflict. During
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this period, the Armed Forces grew from 8,000 to almost 65,000 members, and training and
equipment continued to be provided by the US.
The national interest of this period dictated modernization of the national defense forces.
However, a dedicated effort was also made by the civil and military leadership to support
projects designed to restore infrastructure. This was a method of gaining the faith and
cooperation of the people.
The first transparent presidential elections were held in 1989, when the conservative party
was elected to office. The communist party took note of its poor showing at the polls and made a
last attempt seize power by force. After the failure of the guerrilla offensive, the communists had
no choice other than to start peace negotiations with the government.
Economic development in this period was significant. The new party in power brought
with it a series of new policies, oriented to restoring the principles of private property,
privatizating national assets, liberalizing the market economy, and renewing El Salvador's
presence in international trade by eliminating protectionist barriers. For the first time in the
history of the country, the focused national interest was to obtain sufficient infrastructure and
political stability to promote development.
4. Post-War Period (1992-1995)
In 1992, the peace negotiations were successfully concluded, bringing peace after thirteen
years of war. From that point, El Salvador obtained significant levels of political, economic, and
social improvements, and subordinated the Armed Forces to civilian authority.
The budget allocations for national defense dropped from 19.5% in 1992 to 17.95% in
1995, while the economic development expenditures increased from 51.7% in 1992 to 62.04% in
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1995. A special effort was made to make debt payments current and to reduce the debt service
load from 28.8% in 1992 to 20% in 1995.
At the forefront of the national interest during this period was the desire to restore
national and international credibility in the country's political, economic, and social systems;
such credibility would be necessary to recapture foreign and national private investment. These
investments would be required for El Salvador to make a serious effort at development.
C. SALVADORAN NATIONAL INTEREST PROJECTIONS
The budget allocation data analyzed for this thesis include 1965 to 1995 figures on
spending for defense, development, and debt service. By graphing the percentage of total budget
expenditures in these catagories over the relevant period, it is possible to make observations
about the perceived national interest of the governments in power. The trends revealed in the
graph (see Figure 1) provide insight into the evolution of the national interest in El Salvador.
The period prior to the civil war witnessed an increasing trend in defense expenditures,
with a corresponding drop in resources devoted to development and a reduction in debt service
spending. In the second phase of evolution (indicated by "Wartime Period" in the figure), the
trend continued. Development expenditures fell to a minimum of 52.4% in 1986, while defense
spending increased to 29.8% in 1985. At this point, both levels of spending remained relatively
stable until the end of the conflict. In the period following the war, the trends reversed; defense
spending was reduced as development expenditure increased. Defense expenditures were
reduced more slowly than the rate of increase for development funding. This discrepancy is due to
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Figure 1. Salvadoran National Interest: Expenditures on Defense, Development, and Debt
Service -- 1965 to 1995.
Given that the country maintains the political stability required, it is likely that the following
decade will exhibit similar spending levels. The trend in national interest will be for El Salvador to
sacrifice national defense expenditures to reallocate the resources toward development.
D. HISTORICAL NATIONAL INTEREST
El Salvador has a traditional national interest inherited from its colonial past. This
national interest was defending (from internal or external threats) the self-interest of the few (the
societal elite who controlled the agricultural export economy) over the interest of the majority.
This orientation lasted over a century, and lead to high levels of dissatisfaction among the
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population. Dissatisfaction grew so acute that civil war was the inevitable choice as a
mechanism to reorient the national interest.
Viewing the situation in this way, it is possible to say that El Salvador did not have a
legitimate national security policy until 1992 (one that represents the interests of the majority of
Salvadorans). With the post-war development of a new national structure, a newly formed
national interest has developed that will help define a coherent national security policy.
In discussing the development status of El Salvador, this hope for the future is
insufficient cause to regard the country as anything more than under-developed. El Salvador's
progression toward development is currently focused on defending the new basic goals of peace
and security, and developing a democratic system to ensure equality in opportunity and rights
among its citizens.
This chapter has examined the historical records of Salvadoran budgetary expenditures.
Perceived objectives of the national interest have been explored in three periods relating to the
twelve-year civil war, and these expressions have been examined in light of their economic
results. The next chapter will analyze the evolution of the Salvadoran economy within the same
historical periods. The research emphasis will be the country's productivity and its historical
relation to socio-economic variables. The methodology developed is intended to explain the
sources and the potential solutions for El Salvador's economic instability.
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IV. PRODUCTION IN EL SALVADOR
The present chapter analyzes El Salvador's productivity and its socio-economic effects.
The first part of the chapter discusses the historical evolution of the economy. Secondly,
production is analyzed using the gross domestic product (GDP)'s production sectors, structure,
and its links to income distribution and remittances. Finally, from the socio-economic indicators
the actual economic status is deduced in a chronological and regional comparison.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SALVADORAN ECONOMY
In 1946, El Salvador was one of the most densely populated areas in Central America,
with an economy based primarily on agriculture, particularly on coffee. Some 2,047,000
Salvadorans produced a gross national product of US$174 million, a per capita rate of 218
colones (US$87). Roughly 200 million colones, or 46% of this gross national product came from
agriculture and pastoral production. Of this 200 million colones, the coffee crop accounted for
53 million colones, or 26%. Other basic products were corn, beans, maicillo, sugar, and rice, as
well as hemp and cotton. Industrial production, consisting chiefly of textiles, alcoholic
beverages, seed oils, hides and leather, rope, flour, cement blocks and various minor products,
contributed about 14.6%. Services constituted 39.4% of the total. (Wallach and Adler, 1951)
At that time, a large part of the population was engaged in the production of domestic
foodstuffs, either as a primary occupation or as supplementary employment while working in the
coffee industry. In addition, a large number of families were self-sustaining units, and therefore
a considerable portion of the economy was non-monetary. This level of self-subsistence is one of
the most important reasons why attempts at rebellion were not successful before 1979; even in a
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harsh economic climate, the peasant class was able to cultivate corn and beans to fill their most
basic need - food.
The low degree of industrialization and economic diversification implied that most
commodities other than those needed for basic subsistence were obtained from abroad, and
needed to be paid for by exports. Even if exports accounted only for a small portion of the
country's GNP, averaging about 15% during the 1940's (Wallach and Adler, 1951, p. 27), their
qualitative importance for the economy was significant. Despite the low ratio of exports to gross
national product, the Salvadoran economy must be regarded basically as an export economy.
During this period, four-fifths of the total foreign exchange receipts were derived from coffee
exports (Wallach and Adler, 1951, p. 28). El Salvador's economy was therefore a function of the
volume and price of the coffee crop.
During the 1960's and 1970's, rapid real GDP growth, averaging 5.4% per year, was
supported by favorable agricultural commodity prices, expanding regional markets for
manufactured products following the creation of the Central American Common Market
(CACM), and an accommodating and expanding international financial environment. During
this period, the economy was characterized by the absence of significant domestic imbalances
and low inflation, but social indicators continued to rank among the lowest in the region. The
Salvadoran GDP grew by 5% annually from 1968 to 1978, for a 1.4% per capita increase, per
capita production of basic grains increased as well.
The percentage of rural families not owning land climbed from approximately 12% in
1961 to 29% in 1971, and again to 41% in 1975. While this segment of the population grew,
their incomes declined by 19% (more when adjusted for inflation) from 1971 to 1975. When
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their incomes are measured against the average for all rural groups, the decline is 24% for the
period, while the relative share of the largest landowners increased by 23%. Meanwhile, rural
salaries declined in both absolute and relative terms. When measured in constant units,
agricultural wages fluctuated from 1967 to 1973 and then fell by 25% in 1976 and by 30% in
1978. During the same period, agricultural salaries also lost 23% of their value compared to the
industrial salaries. (Montes, 1980)
In 1 979 the external economic environment deteriorated due to the adverse terms of the
trade environment and the contraction of the regional markets (due to the CACM failure). These
events led to severe macroeconomic imbalances and a drop of a real GDP by 22% and of per
capita GDP by about 27% between 1978 and 1982.
Inappropriate macroeconomic policies, including the nationalization of the financial
sector and export-marketing systems at the beginning of the 1980's, also contributed to the
deterioration of the economic sectors. Beyond the fact that no plans had been prepared in
advance to run the new national industries, no capital was available to carry out operations.
Wanton destruction and the disruption of the road network by insurgent guerrillas caused
a sharp drop in the amount of coffee harvested and processed (to 2.5 million quintals in the 1984-
85 season, 40% lower than in 1979-80, and 2.2 million lower than 1985-86), and also deterred
investment in new crops. Approximately one-half of the farmland in the main agricultural
district in the east of the country was fallow (Fraser and Payne, 1987, p. 90). The decline in
coffee and cotton production can be attributed to the effects of nationalization, low domestic
prices for coffee and low prices for cotton in the international market, in addition to the
destruction caused by the war. Foreign exchange earnings from coffee exports (which normally
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accounted for over 50% of total export earnings) declined from $675 million in 1979 to $408
million in 1983, but earnings from the 1984-1985 harvest rose to $450 million and, in spite of a
smaller harvest in 1985-1986, remained high due to the rise of the world price of coffee.
From 1983 to 1989, the government tried to reactivate the economy. However, GDP
growth averaged only 1.7% during this period; by coincidence, the same as the average estimated
rate of population growth. Fiscal reductions took place in public investment and social sector
expenditures, while the balance of payments gap was closed through more restrictive trade
policies and increased external transfer inflows. These factors probably account for the
stagnation stage of the GDP structure over the last decade.
Today, El Salvador is the most densely populated country in the Western hemisphere
(World Bank, 1994). Its economy is still based on agriculture (40% of the labor force); as in the
past, the center of gravity is still the agricultural exports. The coffee crop promises to remain the
leading export, but two export competitors have appeared: the growing export manufacturing
industry (maquila) and the so-called "export of labor" (20% of the total population is engaged in
this sector, 18% of which is in the US). As mentioned earlier, 50% of the foreign exchange is
historically derived from the export of coffee. Today, 70% of foreign exchange comes through
remittances.
The main industries in the economy are: food processing, textiles, leather,
pharmaceuticals, petroleum products, and manufacturing of machinery. Frozen shrimp is the
leading agricultural export, but other goods manufactured for export market include computer
components, automobile parts, light fixtures, television sets, and clothing. Industrial production
is slowly recuperating from the effects of the war and the economic recession, the low purchasing
30
power of the population, and problems in neighboring countries. Lack of foreign exchange has
in recent years hindered the procurement of raw materials.
B. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
In the 1970's, the composition of El Salvador's GDP shifted away from the agricultural
economy of the 1940's. While emphasis was being placed on diversifying the economy and
improving the industrial sector, there have been no major positive changes in the social sector.
Table 3 illustrates the evolution of GDP structure through the pre-war (1972-1979) and
wartime (1980-1992) periods. This affords a closer look at the influence of infrastructure
improvements and of the tension produced by conflict in Salvadoran production.
Table 3. Composition of the GDP by Production Sector.
Period Agriculture Industry Services
1972-1979 14.0% 23.2% 62.7%
1980-1992 14.2% 22.8% 63.0%
From 1972 to 1979, the agriculture sector contributed only 14% of total GDP, 32% less
than the contribution in 1946. The percentage of GDP derived from industry grew from 14.6% to
23.2%, and the services sector accounted for 62.7% of the average total GDP of the period,
significantly higher than the 39.4% contribution in 1946.
When comparing the two periods, no substantial changes can be observed in the way the
sectors contributed to the GDP. This is not surprising, given the influence of the war on the
economy.
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C. CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Income distribution was among the major issues of dispute that provoked the war. To
examine income distribution within the country's economic environment, an income distribution
analysis will be performed by comparing the population distributions by income level for 1946
and 1993.
The distribution of families by income level for the years 1946 and 1993 presented in
Table 4 were derived from income information expressed in colones. This information was then
expressed in US dollars using an exchange rate of 2.5 colones per dollar for 1946 and of 8.78
colones per dollar for 1993. The resulting amount was adjusted to 1987 dollars by the US GDP
deflator for each year.
Table 4. Distribution of Families by Income Level — 1946.
(Source: Wallach and Adler, 1951)
Level First Second Third Forth Fifth
Income (US$) <100 100-200 200-400 400-600 >600
Number of Families 60% 30% 5% 2.5% 2.5%
There are some differences in the data used to compare the two periods. First, the income
stratification levels used for each period differ in the range of the scale used. Second, the real
purchasing power of money will differ using the adjustment process described here. The
comparison on percentage terms related to the income level is, however, valid.
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Table 5. Distribution of Families by Income Level -- 1993.
(Source: Salvadoran Ministry of Planning, 1993)
Level First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Income (US$) <64 64-137 137-228 228-273 >273
Number of Families 58.4% 27.7% 9% 1% 3.9%
The percentage of Salvadorans in the first and second income level categories during both
periods remain essentially constant, approximately 60% and 30%, respectively. The third level
of income accounted for 9% of the population in 1993, as opposed to 5% in 1946, probably due
to the migration of families from the other income levels to the fourth level. Due to the
difficulties in estimating the actual purchasing power correspondence from level to level, no
more can be inferred about the income dynamics between the periods. It is readily apparent,
however, that Salvadoran income distribution had not experienced significant changes.
For 1992, El Salvador's poverty line was defined by the World Bank as an income level
that is insufficient to purchase two BFB, i.e., 51 dollars per month for urban areas and 30 dollars
per month for rural areas. Extreme poverty is defined as an income level that is insufficient to
purchase one BFB, or 25.5 dollars and 15 dollars in urban and rural areas, respectively (World
Bank, 1994). Using this information it is possible to conclude that at least 40% of the
Salvadorans are above the poverty line. According to the World Bank, Salvadoran poverty is
43% in the urban areas, 55.7% in the rural areas and 48.2% at the national level. These values do
not contradict the findings of the present analysis. They indicate that there is a significant
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could be. Given the low current income level, much can probably be done to reduce poverty in a
relatively short time.
D. GDP EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
Table 6 presents the evolution of GDP using the expenditure approach analysis. The
periods analyzed will again be the pre-war and the wartime periods. The chart was constructed
using the average values of the World Bank GDP information for each period (see Appendix C).
1. Personal Consumption
In the chart, it can be observed that between the two periods, no relevant difference exists
in the levels of personal consumption. From 1988 to 1992, however, consumption increased by
5% (see Appendix D), compared to the 75% average of the last twenty years. This increase has
been possible due to the increase in personal services from 19% in 1988 to almost 32% in 1992.
This increase was at the expenses of a reduction in the consumption of non-durable goods.
Expenditures on durable goods were essentially unchanged.









1972-1979 75.8% 8.1% 16.1% 12.1%
1980-1992 75.3% 12.0% 12.7% 7.2%
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2. Private Investment
The average private investment from 1972 to 1979, at 8.1%, was significantly lower than
the 12% level of the wartime period. Under normal circumstances, the difference in private
investment between the two periods would have indicated an increase in either fixed investments
or inventories or both, but the civil war may account for this difference. It is therefore
convenient to use the information for the period 1988-92 (as found in Appendix D). From 1988
to 1992, fixed investment expenditures steadily increased from 9.5% in 1988 to 12.44% in 1992.
This significant increase was due to investments in the means of production, specifically: 1)
investments in industry increased by 1% from 1.91% in 1988 to 2.84% in 1992; and 2) an
approximately 1% increase in communications (mainly improvements of existing roads and of
the telecommunications system) from 2.94% in 1988 to 4.1% in 1992. It is impossible to
determine the exact net investment, because it is difficult to differentiate improvements from
reconstruction.
El Salvador seems to be improving its chances for expanding production capacity through
long term investment, primarily due to legal reforms such as recognizing private property rights
and intangible assets and reducing the cost of forming large firms. With the exception of 1989,
when the inventory investment reached 2%, the period exhibits a trend toward reduced inventory
levels. This indicates that the purchase of goods has been similar to the current level of
production. In other words, it demonstrates that the level of growth could not be as high as
shown in the recently published figures. While it is unlikely that inventories have been reduced,
it is true that net inventory investment limited.
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3. Government Purchases
Government purchases dropped 4% between the first and second periods. This reflects a
reduction in public administration. More than 30,000 military personnel were demobilized
immediately after the war, and 15,000 government workers were also dismissed from their jobs.
E. SALVADORAN ECONOMIC VARIABLES
1. Inflation and Prices
In Figure 2, it is easy to observe that the average inflation rate increased from 17.8% in
1980 to 32.3% in 1986. This phenomenon can be explained by four main causes: 1) the lack of
goods during this period and an excess of the national currency 2) the adjustment in the rent taxes
3) the increase in the price of gasoline, and 4) the first adjustments in public services prices. A
change in the trend can be observed from 1987 to 1989, when the government obtained external
aid for importing goods into the country.
The 24% spike in the inflationary process in 1990 can be explained by: 1) the new
increase in gasoline prices, 2) expectation effects generated by the implementation of a new
individual tax system, 3) the increment in some public services and, 4) the increase in the dollar
exchange rate value. From 1992, when peace was achieved and the country initiated new
economic policies, the rate of inflation dropped, reaching 8.7% in 1994.
2. Economic Growth
Economic growth, as measured by the real growth rate, was negative from 1980 to 1982.
From 1983 to 1988, economic growth became positive was due to the dollars sent to El Salvador
from the Salvadorans working in the United States. This made the difference that permitted El
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Figure 2. Evolution of the Salvadoran Inflation Rate: 1980-1994.
The government's new economic program began in 1989, and has maintained a steady
focus on its objectives over time. The main objectives were: 1) to match expenditures to
production capacity, 2) to open markets and provide incentives for internal and external
competition 3) reform the tributary system, and 4) begin to privatize state industry.
After the end of the war, El Salvador started a more or less continuous growth trend.
From 1989 to 1993, the average rate of growth was 4.3%. This shows the success of the free
market policy first implemented by the conservative government in 1989. The reactivation of the
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economy created 150,000 new jobs and permitted an increase in the minimum salary (Banco
Central de Reserva, 1994).
-10%
Figure 3. Evolution of Salvadoran Real Growth: 1980-1994.
3. The Labor Market and Unemployment
In 1992, the national employment rate was 91%. Nearly half of the population, however,
worked in the informal sector of the economy. In this sector, individual income is lower than
that received by the population in the formal sector of the economy. This has been attributed to
the lower educational and technical requirements in the informal sector (FUSADES). The lack
of education and technical skills in the Salvadoran workforce is threatening the nation's
economic future.
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Table 7. Educational Level of Employed Labor, 1993.
(Source: Salvadoran Ministry of Planning)
Years of education None 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 >13
Employee 23% 21% 23% 14% 12% 7%
Despite the high level of migration, El Salvador has a high labor force growth rate, on the
order of 3% per year since 1980. The average Latin American labor force growth was 2.4%
during the same period. However, as can be seen in the above table, the labor force remains
largely unskilled. According to World Bank standards, 67% of the Salvadoran labor force is
considered unskilled (employees with less than 7 years of education). It is notable that while the
mean years of education for the Salvadoran labor force is around 4.4 years, it is 8.7 years for the
Salvadorans who have emigrated to the US (Montes, 1987). Labor force participation has been
increasingly urban (55%) and female (37%). Theses trends have been greatly influenced by the
demobilization of the military and an overall increase in economic activity. According to a 1995
World Bank analysis, El Salvador presents a relatively flexible urban labor market, at least by
Latin American standards. The labor turnover rates (exceeding 10%), and the relationship
between real wages, employment, and GDP growth are fairly consistent with a flexible and
competitive labor market; this holds true for total and formal employment. Sector-based shifts in
employment and individual periods of unemployment are also consistent with flexible labor
markets. 2 However, this also produced a modest gap between skilled and unskilled wages, which
indicates a non-segmented market. This is one of the leading factors in the migration of skilled
2The most flexible sectors appear to be agriculture and services. The immediate past job of unemployed persons in the labor
force is 43% in agriculture, 13% in services, and 10% in industry; and, for urban workers, 20% in services, 13.5% in agriculture,
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indicates a non-segmented market. This is one of the leading factors in the migration of skilled
labor. It also reduces the incentive to keep investing in education among the unskilled labor
force.
4. Population and Scarcity
As stated earlier in the chapter, the Salvadoran population is approximately six million,
proportionally distributed in the urban and rural areas. The population density is the highest of
Latin America (258 inhabitants/Km2 ). Some of the reasons for this situation include: the lack of
education among the population,3 and the lack of birth control campaigns during the war. The
average population growth rate was 3.2% in the last decade, but it declined to 2.2% in 1992.
This accelerated population growth makes providing basic services more difficult. In 1992, only
55% of the urban population had a water supply. The situation was worse in the rural areas, were
the percentage decreased to 27%. Furthermore, the high population growth also increased
competition for the existing employment opportunities.
5. Export Leverage
Overall, the positive real growth rate of the economy is largely a consequence of short
term factors, such as the inflow of dollars from Salvadorans in the United States, which has
stimulated the commerce, services, construction and financial sectors.
According to a 1994 statistical abstract of the United States, from 1971 to 1980 34,400
immigrants emigrated from El Salvador to the US; from 1981 to 1990, the same source reported
the unemployed have individual unemployment periods over a year.
3More than 27% of the population over 15 years of age was illiterate in 1994.
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Table 8. Salvadoran Emigration to the US.
(Source: Salvadoran Ministry of Planning, US Statistical Abstract)
Year Legal Illegal Unaccounted Total
1985 96,000 220,000 200,000 516,000
1987 120,000 390,000 217,000 727,000
1991 322,000 478,000 146,000 946,000
According to Salvadoran sources there was a total of 516,000 Salvadorans living in the
United States in 1985, which would represent 1 1% of the total population. Table 8 shows that
727,000 Salvadorans lived in the US by 1987, accounting for 15% of the population. The last
figures show that some 946,000, comprising 18% of El Salvador's total population, were in the
United States by 1991. This phenomenon was accelerated during the war (1979-1992);
according to US sources, the rate of Salvadoran immigration increased by 722% between the
1971-1980 period (3,800 immigrants per year) and the 1981-1992 period (26,000 Salvadoran
immigrants per year). Undoubtedly, this drastic increase reflects the political insecurity and
deteriorating social and economic conditions during the war period.
As a result of this immigration, El Salvador's economy appears to benefit from the large
increase in the net foreign exchange flows. These flows accelerated after 1980, and again after
the 1991 Peace Accords and the reactivation of the economy. Capital inflows in the country have
shown grater variability, while workers' remittances have been increasing. Therefore, higher
flows of foreign exchange are largely due to the increase in the foreign remittances.
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According to the World Bank, these remittances have increased faster than any other
inflow, and currently represent approximately 70% of total exchange flows in El Salvador.
Official transfers represent about 20%. Inflows have relaxed the foreign exchange constraints
and have led to international reserve accumulation.
In particular, remittances have significantly raised national income and national savings,
as may be seen in Table 9. They have increased private consumption, cushioning the fall in real
wages, and have had a favorable impact on the balance of payments (akin to an increase in
exports of labor). Estimates show that, on average, 70% of remittances are consumed, mostly in
non-tradable goods (FUSADES, 1994; MIPLAN, 1993).
Official transfers and official medium and long term capital have originated in great part
from the US and multilateral financial organizations, respectively. These have greatly limited the
inflationary impact of fiscal deficits, especially since 1990, and have helped to finance peace-
related expenditures.
Table 9. Remittances as a Percentage of National Income — 1975-1994.
(Source: World Bank, 1995)
75/79 80/88 89 90 91 92 93 94
National Savings 19.4 7.6 5.8 4.6 8.2 9.4 11.5 13.2
Gross Domestic Savings 19.6 7.0 3.1 0.1 1.3 0.4 2.2 3.4
Net Factor Income -1.5 -2.9 -2.0 -2.0 -1.6 -0.8 -0.5 0.1
Remittances 1.3 3.4 4.6 6.4 8.5 9.8 9.8 9.7
Remittances as % Natl.
Savings
6.7 45.1 81 140 104 104 85 73.2
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6. Remittances and Long-term Challenges
The significant contribution of these factors, particularly the positive effect workers'
remittances have on economic growth, are only temporary. There are two reasons for this
conclusion. First, the United States is strengthening its domestic policy against immigration.
This threatens the stability of the remittances inflow into El Salvador's economy. There were
about 624,000 illegal immigrants in 1991, accounting for at least 67% of total Salvadoran
workers' remittances. This is already an imminent danger for the fragile conditions of the El
Salvador economy. Second, new Salvadoran generations in the US (with legal status) are loosing
their ties with El Salvador. The older generations lose the hope of returning to El Salvador as
they solidify their familial ties in the US. It appears unlikely that long term remittances will
continue to provide inflows to El Salvador as they have done in the recent past. The
manufacturing and agriculture industries will play the dominant roles in the future of El
Salvador's economy.
7. The Trade Deficit
As demonstrated in the GDP structure analysis, El Salvador's economy has begun shifting
from the agricultural to the industrial sector. The agricultural sector has not achieved significant
improvements during the last eleven years, while the manufacturing industry has increased at a
constant rate. In the early years, this style of production was probably enough to satisfy the
population's needs. However, the 3.2% annual population growth rate, combined with low
human capital investment and an ever increasing trade deficit, lowered the standard of living.
The trade pattern has induced several negative economic effects, among which the trade
deficit seems to be the most harmful. El Salvador has been experiencing increasing trade deficits
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since 1981. During the 80's, the government imposed several regulations (subsidies, quotas and
tariffs) to balance trade with other countries. During this period, government interventions an the
internal war severely affected the economy and adversely affected trade.
F. EL SALVADOR'S ECONOMY IN THE REGION
The Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) reports that El Salvador
experienced the highest economic growth rate (6.5%) of Central America in 1995 (see Table 10).
CEPAL also highlighted the fact that El Salvador followed Chile and Peru with the third highest
economic growth rate in all of Latin America. El Salvador also experienced one of the lowest
inflation rates (11.4%). Honduras (28.6%) suffered the highest rate in Central America. On the
other hand, El Salvador has a relatively high deficit/GDP ratio. Only Costa Rica (4.1) and
Honduras (3.7) have a deficit/GDP ratio higher than El Salvador (1.6). Recuperation from the
war accounts for this relatively high value, despite the fact that El Salvador's GDP growth has
been among the highest in its history in the last decade. On the other hand, this high ratio is
consistent with the country's accelerated growth; debt can stimulate growth.





El Salvador 6.5 1.6 7.5
Guatemala 4.5 0.7 4.3
Nicaragua 4.0 1.5 20.2
Honduras 3.5 3.7 4.5
Panama 3.0 1.0 14.3
Costa Rica 2.5 4.1 5.2
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El Salvador's urban unemployment rate is one of the lowest of Central America.
However, under-employment still accounts for 50% of total workforce, making it difficult to take
the official unemployment rate into account.
This chapter has examined El Salvador's economic evolution. The discussion focused on
productivity and the main issues that led the country to where it is today. The next chapter will




V. THE SALVADORAN TRADE DEFICIT
This chapter is to analyzes El Salvador's trade deficit and its consequences. The
objective is to address the problem from several perspectives. Although use real information
related to the problem is emphasized, several assumptions are made either to simplify the
problem or to facilitate the analysis.
The analysis is intended to answer the following questions:
• Who are El Salvador's trade partners, and what is their contribution to the trade
deficit?
• Does El Salvador benefit from its trade relationships?
• Why is the deficit an issue for government decision makers?
• What are the effects of the current balance of trade?
• Should the government intervene to reduce the current trade imbalance?
A. WHO ARE EL SALVADOR'S TRADE PARTNERS, AND WHAT IS THEIR
CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRADE DEFICIT?
El Salvador's most important trading partners are: The United States, Mexico, Germany,
Guatemala and Japan. The share of each of these partners in El Salvador's trade deficit is
presented in Appendix E. As a whole, the trade deficit shows an increasing trend (with the
exception of Germany). As late as 1934, European countries, primarily Germany and the
Scandinavian countries, were El Salvador's chief trading partners. In that year, Europe
accounted for 68% of all Salvadoran exports and 36% of all imports. Since 1938, however, the
United States share has grown to 62% of exports and 47% of imports. In the post-war era, the
dominance of the US among El Salvador's trading partners has been even more pronounced; in
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1947 the United States purchased 78% of the exports and supplied 78% of the imports (Wallach
and Adler, 1951, p. 33). Today, the biggest external contributor to El Salvador's trade deficit is
the US, averaging 43%. A complete analysis would account for all trading partners. However,
the US is El Salvador's largest trading partner, and accounts for a large share of the total trade
deficit. Therefore, this analysis will focus attention on the trade relationship between El
Salvador and the US.
B. DOES EL SALVADOR BENEFIT FROM ITS TRADE RELATIONSHIPS?
Trade gains between any two countries are a function of the international price of goods
that are traded, assuming those goods possess the same quality. Analyzing the comparative
advantage of the produced goods in which each country specializes will help to determine the
benefits of trade for both countries. Due to the complexity of the trade relationship between the
US and El Salvador, a simplified model, consisting of two goods, will be applied in the analysis.
The following assumptions are made in the course of the analysis.
• Both countries are capable of producing coffee and manufactured goods.
• Both countries are capable of producing products at the same level of quality.
• The only input required to produce the two goods is labor.
• The U.S. has 400 units of labor for production and El Salvador has 200 units.
• The labor units are completely interchangeable to produce either of the goods.
Given these assumptions, the discussion of comparative advantages for both countries proceeds
below.
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The average trade prices for coffee and manufactured goods are: $2,073/ton and $629/ton,
respectively.
4
Therefore, 1 ton of coffee is the equivalent of 3.3 tons of manufactured goods in
the world market.
According to David Ricardo, "Maximum output arises when the firm that produced the
good is the one with the lowest opportunity cost." (Gwartney) This is the law of comparative
advantage. An economy not realizing their gains from specialization and division of labor is
ignoring the law of comparative advantages. This is commonly the case in less developed
economies, which is significant in analyzing El Salvador's situation.
1. Comparative Advantage Analysis without Trade
As shown in Figure 4, without trade the US could produce 1600 tons of manufactured
goods or 200 tons of coffee or any mix between the two, constrained by the level of labor. By
analogy, El Salvador could produce 200 tons of coffee or 100 tons of manufactured goods.
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Figure 4. PPF Curves for El Salvador and the United States.
2. Comparative Advantage Analysis with Trade
With trade, each country could produce goods where a comparative advantage exists (see
Figure 5). In this case, El Salvador would produce 200 tons of coffee and the US would produce
1600 tons of manufactured goods. Using the relative world prices, El Salvador's equivalent
production of manufactured goods in trade is 200/0.3 = 66.7 tons of manufactured goods. On the
other hand, the US equivalent production of coffee would be 1600/3.3 = 485 tons of coffee.
Trade would lead both countries to an efficient use of resources. As a result, both countries
would be better off, because of mutual trade gains.
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Figure 5. PPF Curves with Trade
For example, assuming that specialization occurs under the same labor unit constraints and that
the U.S. requires 130 tons of coffee before trade and 140 tons after the trade the benefits of trade
may be summarized as follows (see Table 12).
Table 12. Benefits from Trade.
Goods(tons) U.S. E.S.
Mix w/o trade (130, 1080) (70, 65)
Mix with trade (140,1040) (60 , 560)
Trade benefits ( 10 , -40) (-10,495)
51
El Salvador's benefits from trade can be summarized as follows:
• Manufactured goods consumers will have 495 more tons available, generated by the
savings due to the increase in the efficiency of production. On the other hand, coffee
consumers will have 10 tons less due to the increase in coffee prices.
• The coffee producers will also benefit from the extra profit generated due to
specialization. However, Salvadoran manufactured goods producers would be hurt
from the closing of the factories.
3. Trade Welfare
Viewing trade from the welfare perspective will demonstrate consumer and producer
surpluses from the coffee trade perspective, as well as the total gains and losses that are implicit
in such a transaction. For this purpose we will assume that the national coffee prices were
$2,000 per ton and $2,100 ton from El Salvador and the US, respectively (see Figure 6).
45 70 200
Figure 6. Analysis of Trade and Welfare.
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From the graphical analysis it can be observed that the consumers surplus (CS) and producers
surplus (PS) for both countries are as listed in Table 13.
Table 13. Salvadoran Welfare Analysis.
W/O Trade W/Trade Net Total($)
CS. a+b+c a (b+c) -4,197.5
P.S. e+d b+c+f+e+d b+c+f 9,855.0
Total a+b+c+d+e a+b+c+f+e+d f 5,657.5
The computations are as follows:
CS. = b+c = (2073-2000)*45 +.5*(2073-2000)*25 = $4,197.50
P.S. = f+b+c = .5*(2073-2000)*155 + 4,197.5 =$9,855.00
Total = $5,657.50
In conclusion, Salvadoran consumers lose a surplus equivalent to $4,197.50 as a result of
the increase in the coffee price, that leads to a reduction in consumption by 10 tons of coffee.
The coffee producers increase their surplus through an income transfer from consumers of
$4,197.50, plus the increase in the domestic production of the export crop of 155 tons, equivalent
to $5,657.50. As a whole, producers surplus increases by $9,855.0. Producers' welfare gains
more than offset by the consumers' welfare losses. Therefore, from the production efficiency
point of view, El Salvador as a whole benefits from trade.
In the case of the US, the opposite phenomenon occurs. The producers' surplus loss,
equivalent to $1755, is transferred to the consumers. On the other hand, consumers receive not
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only the transfer due to the increase in production efficiency, but also receive a surplus from the
increase in consumption (area D) equivalent to $912.50. Hence, consumer gains are greater than
producer losses, and there is a resulting net welfare gain for US as a whole, due to the increase in
efficiency in the use of resources (see Table 14).
Table 14 . US Welfare Analysis.
W/O Trade W/Trade Net Total($)
C.S. A A+B+C+D B+C+D 3,847.5
P.S. B - (B) -1,755.0
Total A+B A+B+C+D C+D 2,092.5
The computations are as follows:
C.S. = B+C+D= (2100-2073)* 130 +.5*(2100-2073)*(155-130) = $3,847.50
P.S.= B = .5*(2100-2073)*130 =-$1,755.00
Total = $2,092.50
C. THE IMPACT OF THE DEFICIT ON DECISION MAKING
Above, Salvadoran and US gains and losses from trade were analyzed, with the
conclusion that both countries benefit from trade. The focus now turns to the increasing trend in
the Salvadoran trade deficit. Using the world prices of coffee and manufactured goods, $2,073
per ton and $629 per ton for the US and El Salvador, respectively, the ES trade balance is shown
in Table 15.
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Table 15. Salvadoran Balance of Trade.
Coffee/manufactured goods Quantity(tons) Value($)
Imports (manufactured goods) 560 (352,240)
Exports (coffee) 140 290,220
Trade Deficit — (62,020)
From this table, it can be observed that, even if trade benefits both countries under normal
circumstances, it can produce a transitory negative effect, otherwise known as a trade deficit. For
El Salvador, however, this has become a "steady state". Why, then, does this occur? To address
this question, the obstacles that inhibit the automatic mechanisms which inherently move trade
toward a balance will be analyzed. The measures used are interest and exchange rates.
1. Exchange Rate
When El Salvador imports manufactured goods, a supply of colones and a demand for
dollars is created. When El Salvador exports coffee, a demand for colones and a supply of
dollars is created. When imports exceed exports, a deficit is created. El Salvador needs to
procure more dollars, to maintain the requirements of finance, than are required to procure the
imported goods (see Figure 7).
In El Salvador's case, the deficit reflects a shift to the right in the demand for dollars.
This will in turn increase the exchange rate of colones to dollars. This economic effect should
adjust the trade deficit by diminishing the exchange value of the colon with respect to the dollar.
The consequence will be that US goods will become more expensive in El Salvador and the
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Figure 7. Exchange Rate Analysis of Currency as a Commodity.
As shown in the Table 16, the stabilization of the exchange rates from 1991 to 1995 does
not correspond to the increasing deficit trend. This economic abnormality could be a result of the
accelerated rate of migration from El Salvador to the United States during the war.
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Table 16. Salvadoran Trade Deficit vs. Exchange Rates -- 1988-1995.
(Source: Central Bank of El Salvador)
Year 1988 1989 1990
5
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Deficit 398 664 681 818 1,101 1,170 1,052 1,390
Rate 5.0 5.6 7.6 8.0 8.5 8.78 8.78 8.78
The deficit value is expressed in millions of U.S. dollars.
2. The Migration Effect
However, an external influence has occurred in El Salvador as a result of the civil war
(1979-1991). The the migration of the E.S. labor force to the dollar supplier (US) has produced
an inflow of dollars in the form of remittances; this is exogenous to the Salvadoran production
system. According to the Central Bank of El Salvador, these remittances represent 13% of the
country's total GDP. This significant external cash flow has prevented the exchange rates from
adjusting automatically. Hence, there is no incentive for El Salvador to reduce consumption, and
no pressure to increase productivity by improving the comparative advantage.
Table 17 shows that remittances covered at least 70% of the excess in demand for dollars
produced by the trade deficit. This partly explains why the exchange rates have been almost
stable while the deficit has been increasing.
Table 17. Salvadoran Remittances vs. Deficit.
(Source: El Salvador Central Bank)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
R/D ratio 1 .97 .78 .74 .92 .76
Remittances 719 790 858 864 963 1,061
Deficit 681 818 1,101 1,170 1,052 1,390
In 1990, El Salvador's system of exchange was liberalized.
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The apparently positive external influence (remittances) that increases the availability of
goods, which in turn improves the standard of living in the short term, could lead to a crippling
effect on the economy in the long run if remittances diminish. A trade deficit without
remittances would produce an excess demand for dollars. The purchasing power of Salvadoran
colones would automatically decrease, unless offset by US investment in El Salvador or other
currency flows, reducing the consumption of foreign products. This would only allow
Salvadorans to increase foreign consumption by increasing the value of exports. Therefore,
when remittances are used to fund the consumption of non-durable goods, a long run inhibition
to improve Salvadoran production will result.
If, however, remittances are directed into investment or savings, the result could be a
healthy future economy. Hence, the chronic deficit and its future economic effects on the
economy is an issue for decision makers.
D. EFFECTS OF THE PATTERN OF TRADE
El Salvador's long term agricultural export policy has driven the economy toward a
specific trade pattern that has led to an inefficient use of resources. It is therefore interesting to
examine whether Salvadorans are considering the opportunity cost of resources. This question
will be answered by analyzing El Salvador's natural resources, labor and output mix.
El Salvador is a country with very few natural resources. The country's geographic
extension is 8,260 square miles, of which 60% is cultivable. Agriculture is the dominant sector
in the economy, accounting for 25% of the GDP, employing 40% of the work force, and
contributing two thirds of total exports (Central America Economic Handbook). Considering the
fact that the population is approximately 6 million (726 people per square mile), emphasis on a
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land-intensive production process, is clearly inefficient. Moreover, agricultural exports are
seasonal, engagement leading to seasonal employment and the added expense of a migratory
workforce.
This agro-export policy breeds a low income population and does not utilize the
opportunity cost of the labor force on a permanent employment basis. Consequently, the
government has been forced to subsidize society, especially people under the poverty line, thus
reducing revenues from individual taxes. Therefore, a long run reliance on agricultural exports
has inhibited the opportunity to efficiently use El Salvador's labor resources. Labor is obviously
El Salvador's most abundant resource. On the other hand, one of the most scarce and valuable
resources in the country, land, has been used up in agricultural export production without
analyzing alternative uses that might yield a higher ratio of marginal benefit to marginal cost.
The agricultural export production demands a very large and unskilled labor force,
removing any incentive for the rural population to pursue education. This is clearly illustrated in
the higher turnover ratio in primary schools (see Appendix F). This problem becomes critical in
the sixth grade, where the turnover ratio is 40%. El Salvador's flexibility to diversify production
in the long run may be limited due to lack of skilled manpower. This is a very big opportunity
cost that has been overlooked by the policy makers; it threatens the country's prosperity in the
future and takes away the possibility of changing the deficit trend.
Agriculture uses not only land and labor, but also competes for water, a resource that is
becoming more scarce. The majority of residential areas only enjoy a water supply for a few
hours a day. According to a recent World Bank study:
Three-fourths of the territory is subject to severe soil erosion due to the
encroachment of basic grains production on marginal lands by small farms, which
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in turn results in reduced productivity and lower rural incomes. Only 12% of the
land has forest cover, due to the use of fuel wood for cooking, particularly in rural
areas (89 percent of households). The country suffers from seasonal water
shortages and the quality of its water is deteriorating due to soil erosion,
discharged of municipal sewage and industrial waste water. (World Bank)
The combined effects of the monopolistic style of agriculture and the lack of
communications infrastructure has limited employee preferences and income maximization.
Social dissatisfaction resulting from the inequitable distribution of wealth promted government
action in the form of minimum wage laws beginning in 1978.
The effects of the government's increases in the official minimum wage are difficult to
analyze. Table 18 shows unemployment rates and changes in the minimum wage over the period
1978-1994.












1985 16.90% 5.20 22% -22% Classic
1989 9.40% 10.00 25% 25% Classic
1990 9.96% 11.50 15% 5%
1991 7.50% 13.00 13% 9% Classic
1992 8.73% 13.00
1993 9.94% 14.00 8% 4% Abnormal
1994 16.50 18% 18%
^According to official sources more than 50% of the work force is underemployed in the informal sector of the
economy.
^Inflation base December 1978=100.
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While changes in the actual minimum wage are apparent, discrepancies between relative
and real increases in wages reveal the increases to be purely cosmetic. In some years, the
discrepancy is severe; a 22% relative increase in the minimum wage between 1978 and 1985
yielded a real decrease of 22%.
Ceteris paribus, according to classical economic theory, increasing the minimum wage
above the equilibrium point will increase unemployment, and vice-versa. In the case of El
Salvador, however, unemployment has been influenced by a variety of internal and external
factors, such as the impact of changing weather patterns on the agricultural industry, domestic
unrest, and changes in the region's economic and political landscape. It is therefore difficult to
ascribe changes in the unemployment rate to changes in the minimum wage level. According to
El Salvador's Foundation For The Social and Economic Development (FUSADES), of the total
working population, 50% are employed in the informal sector of the economy (FUSADES, 1994,
p. 3), which further complicates the interpretation of unemployment data.
One must therefore be careful in using classical theory to explain the behavior of
Salvadoran unemployment and minimum wage indicators. For instance, a 121% relative
increase, corresponding to a 42% real increase, occured in minimum wages from 1985 to 1990
(see Figure 8). Over the same period, unemployment fell from 16.9% to 9.96%. This seems to
contradict the classical view of the effect of an increase in the minimum wage, yet the flight of
human capital that occured during the war period is a more likely explanation for the drop in
unemployment. Similarly, while a 15% real increase in the minimum wage took place from 1991
to 1993, changes in unemployment were insignificant. The small variations in the
61
unemployment rate over that period are probably the result of reconstruction efforts and the












-Minimum Wage Unemployment Rate
Figure 8. Unemployment and the Minimum Wage in the Post-War Period.
The effects of the war on unemployment in El Salvador cannot be understated. Before
the civil war, abundant labor was available for the agricultural export firms. The labor supply
curve can be characterized as infinitely inelastic. On the other hand, employer's demand for
labor had a downward slope; a decline in wages led to an increase in the demand for labor.
However, if the wages increased, a firm's supply of labor was not affected because they could
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employ as much labor as they wanted without paying extra wages for it. During the war two
major developments occurred:
• The destruction of infrastructure and the outflow of capital due to political instability
increased the pitch of the employers demand curve, thus shrinking the demand for
labor.
• The exodus of labor from the areas of conflict to the US caused a shrinking in the
supply of labor.
Figure 9 illustrates the coincidence of these occurences on the Salvadoran labor market.
Figure 9. Labor Market During the War.
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Government intervention in setting minimum wages has not resulted in a redistribution of
wealth. The inequities caused by the country's agricultural export dominated pattern of trade
remain a cause of concern despite steady increases in the minimum wage. Additionally, the
effect of minimum wage legislation on unemployment is difficult to justify or condemn, due to
the presence of the large informal sector of the economy, but the lack of evidence for a positive
impact, and the fact that government intervention only moves the economy away from a free-
market system, seem to indicate a long-run negative effect.
E. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
According to the prior analysis of the negative short run externalities, it can be concluded
that the government should intervene to decrease the trade deficit and its negative effects. At
present the government provides incentives such as subsidies and preferential interest rates for
loans to agricultural exporters. This policy improves profits of a small number of firms, but fails
to redistribute income. Therefore, the government should remove the ineffective incentives. A
regulatory system that encourages production in agriculture (the exporting sector) to the point
where the ratio of marginal benefit to marginal cost is equal across all activities would be
preferable. Incentives to increase minimum wages should be avoided, to discourage premature
incorporation of youth into the agricultural labor force.
The large land areas demanded by export crops have almost extinguished food crop
production. In fact, 25% of imports involve food (see Appendix G). The government should
therefore encourage food crop production that utilizes highly intensive cultivation methods. This
in turn would increase food supplies at competitive prices, improving standards of living despite
low wages.
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Encouragement, even to the point of subsidy, should be provided to those industries that
demand highly skilled workers. This would encourage higher education and diversification of
labor, especially where the comparative advantage is greatest.
The present chapter has analyzed the trade deficit, and its short and long term effects.
The problem has been examined through different perspectives, to show the complexity and the
significance of the problem. In the next chapter, findings from the research to this point will be
used to discuss future economic possibilities in El Salvador.
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VI. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PICTURE
This chapter will analyze the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities in El
Salvador's economy today. The analysis will consider both short and long term perspectives.
A. THE ECONOMIC STRENGTHS
El Salvador has a number of key short term strengths. While some of these factors may
be less than optimum, and therefore undesirable in the long term, they nevertheless provide
necessary support in the current economic environment. The first of these strengths are centered
around the availability of labor.
First, the level of labor flexibility in the economy could allow for a natural shift to a more
diversified production system without worsening the unemployment situation. Second, the
phenomenon of export labor, while not a viable long-term solution, is releasing pressure on
exchange rates and lessening inflationary effects. Remittances from the estimated 20% of
Salvadorans who work abroad account for 13% of the country's GDP, and provide for 70% of
foreign exchange.
Another strength in the current situation is El Salvador's favorable credit record. Even in
the worst of economic (and political) times, the country has managed to service the external debt.
This will be another factor at work in the task of bringing external investment into El Salvador,
along with the fact that the Salvadoran economy has exhibited low inflation over the past six
years.
The growth of the industrial manufacturing sector has created jobs that are reducing
unemployment. The low wages paid are indicative of the country's inability to support growth
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unaided, but the mere existence of jobs has eased public dissatisfaction. This has been of
enormous benefit in the short term by enhancing immediate political stability.
In the long term, however, it is the people of El Salvador that are its greatest strength.
They are the only abundant resource available for conversion into an asset. Another long-term
strength is to be found in the series of legal reforms that have taken place in recent years.
Changes in property rights laws are making it possible to procure and securely maintain private
property; this is necessary to form the infrastructure for development. Additional reductions in
the costs of establishing new firms and in trade restrictions are also promoting capital
investment.
B. THE ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES
The most immediate, and perhaps most severe, weakness of the current economy is the
wound left by the country's history. As noted in earlier chapters, the lack of a truly
representative national interest throughout the country's history has continually created obstacles
to economic development. The first signs of a national vision were found in the successful effort
to establish and maintain peace; Salvadorans have much to learn about each other before a
cohesive national vision exists. Beyond the lack of historical representation, however, the years
of authoritarian rule (whether on the part of government or insurgents) have left many people
with an abiding distrust of leadership; they are disposed to question the credibility of those who
are responsible for leading the country to development.
One weakness that cannot be changed is El Salvador's lack of natural resources. It need
not be a long-term problem, given the availability of external capital to develop industry.
Unfortunately, low resource levels equate to higher development costs, and this exacerbates the
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lack of available capital. Similarly, a comparatively high level of human capital is also desirable
in overcoming the lack of natural resources, but human capital accumulation is a long-term
process. It will be some time before El Salvador can expect any current or future human capital
investment to pay off. In light of these two resource deficits, and the fact that only additional
capital will overcome the barriers to development, the absence of capital becomes the country's
greatest present weakness.
The absence of capital resurfaces again and again as an obstacle to development. The
country's war-crippled infrastructure continues to frustrate government and business
development efforts. All of the available funds are consumed in restoration of roads, bridges,
communications networks, and a variety of services essential to the conduct of business and
industry to pre-war functionality. Expanding the coverage and level of service is beyond the
capability of the economy in its present state.
Another short term weakness is the continuing existence of subsidies. Progress toward a
free market system has been retarded to maintain social order; an outright repeal of subsidies
would create widespread public discontent at the present time. It is hoped that a peaceful
transition to a free market can be achieved in the mid-term.
A long-term weakness that is immediately apparent is the product of, and closely related
to, the historical lack of a truly national interest in El Salvador. Capitalists in El Salvador are not
accustomed to viewing operations from the workers' perspective. In an agricultural export
economy dependent on unskilled, seasonal labor, this is possible. As the need arises for more
skilled labor, however, so will the competition for employees, with the result that the business
and industrial cultures of El Salvador will have to be more accommodating to workers' needs.
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This need for change extends to the country's political structures as well. El Salvador's
historical style of leadership has been to confront the manifestations of problems with violent
repression instead of real solutions. The principal source of discontent among Salvadorans has
been and continues to be the poor distribution of income. None of the solutions to this problem
are short-term propositions, however, and the ability of the country as a whole to be patient will
substantially affect overall stability for some time to come.
Another problem that poses long-term repercussions is the fact that the law of
comparative advantage has been ignored throughout El Salvador's economic history. This has
resulted in a low level of production, to which business and industry have become accustomed.
This is compounded by the presence of what can be called "artificial consumption", whereby
remittances from the external workforce fund a standard of living for some of the population that
is in excess of what their unskilled labor can command in the market. As a result, there is limited
incentive to improve skills has developed. This presents an additional weakness to be confronted
in the long term.
C. THE ECONOMIC THREATS
A threat which must be considered in the short term is the possibility of an increased US
domestic anti-immigration policy. This could reduce by up to 67% the remittances inflow from
the external workforce, creating a 10% percent reduction in the country's GDP. Furthermore, the
deportation of Salvadorans living illegally in the US could rapidly increase El Salvador's
population (by as much as 14%).
Additionally, political stability has not been consolidated. Institutional inefficiency
provides opportunity to the forces opposed to democracy. The inability of both government and
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the political parties to solve problems could easily become the main source of instability. Social
conditions are unacceptably low for at least 60% of the total population. This could become a
source of desperation in the near future.
The fixed pattern in the country's policies and their consequences, given the
inefficiencies in resource allocation, could mean that the country is heading toward conditions
reminiscent of the early 1980's. It is difficult to make this judgment, however, given the changes
that have already taken place.
Over the long term, several items stand out as threats to development. The country's
trade pattern has lead to a constantly increasing deficit. This problem could cripple the economy
in the long run. There has been a disturbing rise in delinquency over the past five years. As
mentioned previously, this has a tendency to create internal insecurity that is unattractive to
potential foreign investors. Accelerated population growth is increasing scarcity in the country,
leading to an increase in social problems such as delinquency, drugs, prostitution, and various
criminal acts. Beyond the social decay exhibited by such problems, there are threats to
development in the form of productivity and efficiency losses.
El Salvador's environment is vulnerable. The style of agriculture has not considered the
value of land and water in El Salvador. As a result, there has been widespread deforestation and
destruction of water resources that will increase the ecological problems in the future. This
environmental threat can be expected to have further economic and social ramifications.
The lack of private investment taking place in El Salvador, as discussed earlier, indicates
that reductions in production may be anticipated in the future. If El Salvador's real growth were
the same as the population growth, stagnation of the economy would occur. While remittances
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play a supportive role in the short term, ties between generations of immigrants to the home
country will likely erode (perhaps in the next two generations), reducing GDP and having
corresponding effects on the trade deficit.
D. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
An opportunity exists because the state still owns a variety of ongoing concerns.
Continued privatization would provide additional monetary resources with which to continue the
government's programs. These programs involve technical assistance, land transfer, internal
security, and educational infrastructure. It might also be possible to improve the standard of
living at the poorest levels of Salvadoran society by creating incentives to grow food crops.
The availability of cash remittances from Salvadorans outside the country presents an
opportunity to encourage investment and savings by the recipients of funds. Additionally, much
could be done to capitalize on the fact that so many Salvadorans work abroad to stimulate, for
example, tourism.
A long-term opportunity exists today to begin investing in human capital to support El
Salvador's development. Additionally, there is an opportunity to benefit in the long term from
the ability of El Salvador to manage scarce resources. All of these opportunities, however, will
only exist as long as political stability is maintained.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
El Salvador is a living example of a country that has not developed a vision to follow
over the long term. Its lack of a representative national interest has condemned the country to
remain underdeveloped. There are several primary factors preventing the country from changing
its inefficient production system.
First, the agricultural export sector produces only 25% of the country's GDP, but
demands 40% of the labor force and 100% of the cultivable land (60% of the total territory).
Additionally, seasonal engagement of the agricultural labor force leads to low productivity, low
income, and an unskilled labor force. The effect of these negative impacts of the agricultural
sector are compounded by an historically low investment in human capital that has inhibited the
country's ability to shift production in the short term. The inadequate distribution of income has
kept the majority of Salvadorans to a very low standard of living, and has produced political
instability.
Short term political stabilization depends on El Salvador's ability to obtain external
economic assistance. In the long term, however, political stability depends on the match of the
economic policy and the country's resources, including human capital. Twenty percent of El
Salvador's population is outside the country (90% of this external population is in the United
States). Remittances from Salvadorans in the US constitute 13% of the country's GDP and
represent 70% of the foreign currency inflow, which has prevented the exchange rates from
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adjusting automatically. There is therefore no incentive for the country to reduce consumption
and no pressure to increase productivity by improving El Salvador's comparative advantage.
If the actual conditions of El Salvador's external environment remain unchanged, rapid
growth will continue in a similar trend seen in the country for the last six years. However, there
is no reason to believe that the population's standard of living will be improved, given the low
levels of investment in development.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to recommend specific policy measures to the
government of El Salvador, it is useful to review the major areas of consideration around which
it is presumed such policy would be formed. Results of research and analysis presented earlier
allow several areas to be discussed.
Historically, the interest of the country's leadership has been that of the few over the
majority. Development will require El Salvador to develop a vision that can be shared by every
one of her citizens. Development itself should take place through policies based on the people,
the most valuable abundant resource that the nation possesses.
The apparently positive effect of remittances from abroad must be seen to improve the
standard of life in the short term, and consideration must be given to measures designed to reduce
dependence on remittances, and to be prepared for the eventual evaporation of them altogether.
One positive step to take advantage of the current level of remittances is to encourage investment
or savings. A preventative measure in this area, as well as a step on the road to development,
would be to shift production to areas of comparative advantage, such as those with labor intensive,
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low capital, and low technology requirements. In this event, eventual loss of external remittances
could be tolerated without a corresponding increase in the trade deficit.
Government intervention to decrease the trade deficit should be limited to removing the
ineffective incentives (such as subsidies) offered to inefficient production activity. It should also
consider a regulatory system that encourages production in the sectors where the ratio of
marginal benefit over marginal cost is equal across all activities. Regardless of the trade deficit's
negative effects, El Salvador obtains welfare gains from trading. Trade should therefore be
encouraged in a way that follows the law of comparative advantage to improve productivity.
The social conditions endured by the majority of Salvadorans in the past has led to civil
war. Such recent historical evidence of dissatisfaction justifies government policy that is aimed
at improving the standard of living. Income distribution is still a thorny issue that could spark
internal conflict in El Salvador, and it therefore needs special immediate attention. El Salvador's
democratization process has to include a economic redefinition of the country, that leads to
abundance first and then to development. In all of these actions, however, the government should
remain as a provider and avoid interventionist approaches to economic issues; they should allow
market forces to dictate events. The Government should not increase the minimum wage, to avoid
prematurely incorporating youth into the agricultural labor force. Higher minimum wages reduce
the incentive to pursue education. Education contributes to a skilled labor force in the long term.
25% of imports are devoted to satisfying the demand for food. Encouraging of food crop producers
that utilize highly intensive cultivation methods would improve the trade situation by lowering the
reliance on imported food. This in turn would increase availability of goods at competitive prices
resulting in improved standards of living, even if there are low wages. The government should
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subsidize those industries that demand highly skilled workers to encourage higher education and
therefore diversification of labor into other sectors of the economy, especially where the
comparative advantage is greatest.
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APPENDIX A. NATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN EL SALVADOR:
1976-1995
EXPENDITURES BY PRIMARY ORGANIZATION UNITS
PERIOD 1976-1985
Pre-war period War period
Primary organization units 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Legislative Branch 0.25% 0.23% 0.23% 0.21% 0.06% 0.05% 0.11% 0.30% 0.28% 0.31%
Judicial Branch 1.32% 1.29% 1.08% 0.93% 1.01% 1.01% 0.94% 0.86% 0.77% 1.12%
Accounting Department 0.47% 0.41% 0.40% 0.46% 0.45% 0.41% 0.37% 0.36% 0.32% 0.37%
Electoral Court 0.16% 0.13% 0.14% 0.06% 0.12% 0.05% 0.19% 0.06% 0.06% 0.19%
Civil Service Court 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Investigation Bureau 0.19% 0.17% 0.21% 0.40% 0.39% 0.13% 0.16% 0.11% 0.10% 0.13%
Child Support 0.25% 0.24% 0.26% 0.27% 0.26% 0.21% 0.22% 0.17% 0.16% 0.18%
Human Rights — ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Executive Branch 2.95% 1.98% 1.149; 1.10% 0.95% 80%' 0.76% 0.73% 0.70% 0.63%
Ministry of Planning 0.00% 1.35% 0.99% 1 .63% 2.44% 4.83% 3.54% 1 .90% 1.81% 0.70%
Ministry of Treasury 8.30% 7.70% 7.84% 8.04% 7.36% 8.08% 7.19% 5.64% 5.44% 6.22%
Ministry of External Affairs 0.81% 0.97% 0.75% 0.66% 0.72% 0.65% 0.63% 0.61% 0.55% 0.55%
Ministry of Internal Affairs 1.91% 2.78% 3.29% 2.79% 2.93% 2.16% 2.60% 2.14% 1 .89% 2.01%
Internal Security Secretary 2.16% 2.59% 2.55% 3.14% 4.39% 5.58% 5.75% 5.89% 5.97% 6.36%
Ministry of National Defense 4.99% 5.17% 5.89% 5.62% 6.30% 9.02% 1 1 .72% 13.21% 17.33% 21.44%
Ministry of Justice 1 .82% 1 .69% 1 .66% 1 .82% 1 .90% 1 .70% 1.32% 1 .09% 1.00% 1.01%
Ministry of Communication ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Ministry of Education 25.59% 24.90% 23.16% 20.21% 25.18% 21.07% 18.09% 16.85% 15.35% 17.17%
Ministry of Welfare 12.32% 11.28% 11.89% 10.17% 10.21% 8.99% 8.49% 8.68% 8.71% 8.14%
Ministry of Work 0.73% 0.71% 0.72% 0.75% 1.15% 0.66% 0.76% 0.50% 0.68% 0.46%
External Commerce Ministry ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.17% 0.16% 0.29% 0.22%
Ministry of Economy 6.18% 5.06% 6.74% 12.36% 7.94% 6.94% 3.82% 4.64% 2.02% 1.16%
Ministry of Agriculture 9.94% 8.91% 8.20% 6.86% 7.25% 6.86% 10.95% 7.68% 6.44% 6 82%
Public Development Ministry 14.26% 16.70% 17.50% 16.53% 13.90% 12.59% 11.08% 11.02% 10.09% 10.31%
Housing Development
Ministry
— — ... — — — ... — ... ...
Transference Provision ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Total 94.63% 94.26% 94.63% 94.03% 94.94% 91.82% 88.85% 82.58% 79.87% 85.42%
National Debt Service 5.37% 5.74% 5.37% 5.97% 5.06% 8.18% 11.15% 17.42% 20.13% 14.58%
Grant total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Annual Salvadoran budget laws.
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EXPENDITURES BY PRIMARY ORGANIZATION UNITS
PERIOD 1986-1995
War period Post-war period
Primary organization units 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1 993 1994 1995
Legislative Branch 0.33% 0.27% 0.28% 0.27% 0.36% 0.38% 0.50% 0.55% 0.62% 0.69%
Judicial Branch 1.01% 0.91% 1.24% 1.61% 1.75% 2.06% 2.67% 3.16% 3.65% 4.32%
Accounting Department 0.35% 0.32% 0.34% 0.32% 0.54% 0.46% 0.70% 0.60% 0.62% 0.61%
Electoral Court 0.05% 0.05% 0.33% 0.45% 0.35% 0.41% 0.16% 0.37% 0.41% 0.30%
Civil Service Court 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Investigation Bureau 0.12% 0.10% 0.12% 0.12% 0.15% 0.19% 0.15% 0.21% 0.20% 0.50%
Child Support 0.16% 0.16% 0.17% 0.16% 0.18% 0.19% 0.18% 0.23% 0.24% 0.32%
Human Rights — — — — — — — — ... ...
Executive Branch 0.58% 0.56% 0.54% 0.51% 0.74% 0.97% 0.72% 2.48% 5.36% 1.31%
Ministry of Planning 0.56% 0.85% 0.82% 0.60% 0.46% 0.29% 0.18% 0.18% 0.16% 0.18%
Ministry of Treasury 5.87% 9.48% 5.90% 5.65% 7.60% 10.92% 6.87% 10.13% 10.56% 11.21%
Ministry of External Affairs 0.51% 0.83% 0.88% 0.99% 1.19% 2.05% 1 .52% 1 .40% 1.16% 1 .25%
Ministry of Internal Affairs 0.92% 1.13% 1.41% 2.00% 1 .99% 2.40% 2.40% 1.91% 1.56% 1 .49%
Internal Security Secretary 6.70% 5.58% 6.10% 5.84% 5.79% 4.95% 3.42% 3.35% 1 .99% 7.37%
Ministry of National Defense 21.60% 20.33% 22.05% 20.88% 20.48% 17.82% 13.71% 11.35% 9.04% 9.09%
Ministry of Justice 0.99% 0.96% 1.00% 0.96% 1 .08% 1.06% 1 .02% 1.18% 0.89% 1 .02%
Ministry of Communication — — — — — — — ... ... ...
Ministry of Education 15.29% 14.53% 15.71% 15.33% 16.63% 15.36% 13.74% 14.49% 14.67% 14.94%
Ministry of Welfare 7.10% 8.32% 8.24% 8.05% 8.86% 8.12% 7.84% 9.56% 9.20% 10.25%
Ministry of Work 0.43% 0.40% 0.40% 0.41% 0.39% 0349, 0.28% 0.24% 0.21% 0.21%
External Commerce Ministry 0.17% 0.15% 0.16% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Ministry of Economy 0.85% 0.84% 0.85% 2.11% 1.21% 1.19% 1.24% 1 .25% 0.97% 0.85%
Ministry of Agriculture 5.96% 5.01% 4.92% 5.13% 5.24% 5.33% 3.40% 3.14% 2.64% 3.28%
Public Development Ministry 9.99% 8.30% 8.45% 8.72% 11.56% 10.97% 10.47% 12.93% 13.40% 10.18%
Housing Development
Ministry
— — — — — — — — — ...
Transference Provision — — — — — — ... ... ... ...
Total 81.50% 82.20% 81.91% 82.13% 86.52% 85.41% 7 1 .04% 79.16% 77.97% 79.85%
National Debt Service 18.50% 17.80% 18.09% 17.87% 13.48% 14.59% 28.96% 20.84% 22.03% 20.15%
Grant total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Annual Salvadoran budget laws.
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APPENDIX B. DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEBT
EXPENDITURES: 1965-1995
EXPENDITURES BY PRIMARY ORGANIZATION UNITS
PERIOD 1965-1985
Pre-War period War period








































11.56% 13.62% 16.77% 20.07% 21.25% 25.20% 29.80%
82.48% 81.32% 75.05% 68.82% 61.41% 54.79% 55.70%
20.21% 25.18% 21.07% 18.09% 16.85% 15.35% 17.17%
0.66% 0.72% 0.65% 0.63% 0.61% 0.55% 0.55%
10.92% 11.37% 9.65% 9.25% 9.18% 9.39% 8.60%
16.53% 13.90% 12.59% 11.08% 11.02% 10.09% 10.31%
6.86% 7.25% 6.86% 10.95% 7.68% 6.44% 6.82%
12.36% 7.94% 6.94% 3.99% 4.80% 2.31% 1.38%
14.94% 14.97% 17.28% 14.82% 11.25% 10.65% 10.88%
Total Expenditures 87.83% 87.14% 94.63% 94.28% 94.64% 94.04% 94.95% 91.83% 88.88% 82.66% 79.98% 85.50%
National Debt 12.17% 12.86% 5.37% 5.72% 5.36% 5.96% 5.05% 8.17% 11.12% 17.34% 20.02% 14.50%
Grant total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Annual Salvadoran budget laws.
EXPENDITURES BY PRIMARY ORGANIZATION UNITS
PERIOD 1986-1995
War period Post*War period
Expenditures 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National Defense 29.22% 27.03% 29.56% 28.72% 28.25% 25.17% 19.52% 16.61% 12.59% 17.95%
Development 52.38% 55.24% 52.43% 53.48% 58.31% 60.29% 51.66% 62.67% 65.52%) 62.04%
Education and Training 17.33% 16.48% 17.77% 17.26% 16.63% 15.36% 13.74% 14.49% 14.67%. 14.94%
International Affairs 0.51% 0.83% 0.88% 0.99% 1.19% 2.05% 1.52% 1.40% 1.16% 1.25%
Health and Welfare 7.54% 8.71% 8.64% 8.46% 9.25% 8.46% 8.12% 9.80% 9.41% 10.46%
Community 9.99% 8.30% 8.45% 8.72% 11.56% 10.97% 10.47%c 13.34% 13.72% 10.54%
Development
Agriculture 5.96% 5.01% 4.92% 5.13% 5.24% 5.33% 3.40%) 3.14% 2.64% 3.28%
Commerce and 1.03% 0.99% 1.01% 2.27% 1.21% 1.19% 1.24% 1.25% 0.97% 0.85%
Transportation
General Government 10.03% 14.92% 10.76% 10.66% 13.23% 16.94% 13.17%) 19.25% 22.95% 20.71%
Total Expenditures 81.59% 82.27% 81.99% 82.21% 86.56% 85.46% 71.19% 79.28% 78.11% 79.99%
National Debt 18.41% 17.73% 18.01% 17.79% 13.44% 14.54% 28.81% 20.72% 21.89% 20.01%
Grant total 100.00
%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00
%
Source: Annual Salvadoran budget laws.
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APPENDIX C. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GDP at Factor Cost
(Millions of 1987 Salvadoran Colones)
Year Agriculture Industry Services GDP
1972 2,875 4,387 12,392 19,654
1973 2,925 4,585 13,113 20,623
1974 3,225 4,854 13,887 21,966
1975 3,427 5,362 14,351 23,140
1976 3,157 5,674 15,171 24,002
1977 3,271 6,248 15,882 25,401
1978 3,729 6,445 16,922 27,096
1979 3,863 6,263 16,538 26,664
Average 3,309 5,477 14,782 23,568
% (*) 14.0% 23.2% 62.7%
1980 3,662 5,542 15,197 24,401
1981 3,428 4,981 13,997 22,406
1982 3,268 4,633 13,266 21,167
1983 3,164 4,745 13,399 21,308
1984 3,269 4,773 13,741 21,783
1985 3,234 4,964 14,094 22,292
1986 3,133 5,089 14,313 22,535
1987 3,198 5,291 14,652 23,141
1988 3,168 5,476 14,931 23,575
1989 3,183 5,607 15,028 23,818
1990 3,420 5,667 15,444 24,531
1991 3,418 6,001 16,069 25,488
1992 3,667 6,396 17,505 27,568
Average 3,324 5,320 14,741 23,386
% (*) 14.2% 22.8% 63.0%
Source: World Tables 1994, World Bank, pp. 153,252.
*
: % of total expenditure
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APPENDIX D. EXPENDITURE APPROACH ANALYSIS
GDP Structure














1972 16,694 1,679 2,544 20,917 (1,263) 19,654
1973 17,929 1,873 3,298 23,100 (2,476) 20,624
1974 18,431 1,800 4,156 24,387 (2,422) 21,965
1975 18,963 1,958 3,732 24,653 (1,514) 23,139
1976 20,823 2,266 4,131 27,220 (3,219) 24,001
1977 23,274 2,379 5,930 31,583 (6,182) 25,401
1978 23,970 2,640 6,102 32,712 (5,616) 27,096
1979 22,422 2,706 4,706 29,834 (3,171) 26,663
Average 20,313 2,163 4,325 26,801 (3,233) 23,568
% (*) 75.8% 8.1% 16.1% -12.1%
1980 20,480 2,555 3,200 26,235 (1,835) 24,400
1981 18,732 2,645 3,076 24,453 (2,048) 22,405
1982 17,055 2,634 2,763 22,452 (1,285) 21,167
1983 17,285 2,661 2,528 22,474 (1,166) 21,308
1984 17,894 2,789 2,603 23,286 (1,504) 21,782
1985 18,572 2,977 2,458 24,007 (1,716) 22,291
1986 18,568 3,089 2,986 24,643 (2,108) 22,535
1987 18,744 3,181 2,861 24,786 (1,645) 23,141
1988 18,951 3,261 3,390 25,602 (2,026) 23,576
1989 19,252 3,222 4,274 26,748 (2,931) 23,817
1990 19,687 3,252 3,027 25,966 (1,435) 24,531
1991 20,172 3,394 3,708 27,274 (1,786) 25,488
1992 20,700 3,400 4,579 28,679 (2,111) 26,568
Average 18,930 3,005 3,189 25,123 (1,815) 23,308
% (*) 75.3% 12.0% 12.7% -7.2%
Source: World Tables 1994, World Bank, pp. 153,252.
*
: % of the Domestic Absorption
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Gross Domestic Product Structure
(Thousands of Salvadoran Colones)
Expenditure: 1988 1989 1990 I 99 1 1992
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION 80.95% 82.93% 88.00% 87.51% 88.45%
- Durable goods 0.79% 0.74% 0.81% 0.67% 0.83%
- Non-durable goods 60.97% 62.22% 66.24% 55.85% 55.78%
- Services 19.19% 19.97% 20.95% 30.99% 31.84%
GROSS PRIVATE INVESTMENT 9.69% 11.84% 9.55% 11.29% 12.44%
. Fixed Investment 9.53% 9.83% 9.51% 10.94% 12.30%
- Means of Production 6.11% 6.44% 6.13% 7.48% 8.82%
Agriculture 0.19% 0.21% 0.25% 0.31% 0.36%
Industry 1.91% 1.76% 1.98% 2.47% 2.84%
Communication 2.94% 3.22% 2.85% 3.68% 4.10%
Others 1.07% 1.26% 1.06% 1.02% 1.52%
- Construction 3.42% 3.39% 3.38% 3.45% 3.48%
Residential 2.35% 2.61% 2.73% 2.73% 2.48%
Industrial 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% 0.07% 0.33%
Services 0.75% 0.53% 0.47% 0.44% 0.49%
Others 0.22% 0.18% 0.13% 0.21% 0.19%
. Inventories 0.16% 2.00% 0.04% 0.36% 0.14%
GOVERNMENT PURCHASES 15.83% 15.68% 13.59% 13.56% 14.17%
. Consumption 12.73% 12.19% 11.32% 11.03% 10.53%
. Means of production 0.47% 0.80% 0.35% 0.45% 1.09%
. Construction 2.63% 2.69% 1.91% 2.08% 2.55%
NET EXPORTS -6.47% -10.45% -11.14% -12.36% -15.06%
. Exports goods & services 15.81% 13.24% 15.92% 14.76% 14.18%
. Imports goods & services 22.29% 23.69% 27.07% 27.12% 29.24%
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(GDP)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, 1994
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Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices
(Thousands of Salvadoran Colones)
Expenditure: 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION 19,082,541 19,745,231 21,605,490 22,321,185 23,594,702
- Durable goods 186,238 177,217 199,670 169,833 221,106
- Non-durable goods 14,372,075 14,813,965 16,263,270 14,245,774 14,879,739
- Services 4,524,228 4,754,049 5,142,549 7,905,578 8,493,857
GROSS PRIVATE INVESTMENT 2,284,812 2,818,404 2,344,714 2,880,816 3,317,925
. Fixed Investment 2,245,962 2,341,123 2,334,429 2,789,334 3,281,909
- Means of Production 1,440,024 1,534,007 1,505,539 1,909,264 2,353,568
Agriculture 45,310 49,715 60,932 78,832 95,256
Industry 449,744 419,145 484,944 629,536 758,094
Communication 692,318 766,043 699,731 939,848 1,093,857
Others 252,652 299,104 259,932 261,048 406,362
- Construction 805,938 807,116 828,890 880,070 928,341
Residential 554,578 621,552 669,713 695,666 661,964
Industrial 21,966 15,439 10,345 19,001 87,126
Services 176,848 127,280 116,542 111,657 129,451
Others 52,546 42,845 32,290 53,747 49,800
. Inventories 38,850 477,281 10,285 91,482 36,015
GOVERNMENT PURCHASES 3,732,159 3,733,741 3,336,249 3,459,114 3,781,173
. Consumption 3,001,336 2,903,282 2,780,147 2,814,046 2,809,924
. Means of production 110,778 189,406 86,226 114,219 291,666
. Construction 620,045 641,053 469,876 530,849 679,583
NET EXPORTS (1,526,252) (2,488,718) (2,735,779) (3,153,019) (4,016,729)
. Exports goods & services 3,727,076 3,151,785 3,909,631 3,765,583 3,782,338
. Imports goods & services 5,253,328 5,640,503 6,645,410 6,918,601 7,799,067
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 23,573,260 23,808,659 24,550,674 25,508,096 26,677,071
(GDP)
Source: Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, 1 994
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El Salvador's Economic Indicators
(1987=100)
Year GNP(c) CPI Real GNP GDP Real GDP GDP growth (GDP/GNP)%
1972 2.855 6.80 19,423 2,882 19,607 100.95%
1973 3,294 6.18 20,339 3,331 20,567 49% 101.12%.
1974 3,891 5.56 21,633 3,944 21,928 6.6% 101.36%
1975 4,412 5.16 22,764 4,478 23,105 5.4% 101.50%
1976 5,689 4.20 23,865 5,706 23,936 3.6% 100.30%
1977 7,095 3.53 25,039 7,167 25,293 5.7% 101.01%
1978 7,562 3.51 26,561 7,692 27,018 6.8% 101.72%
1979 8,547 3.10 26,406 8,607 26,591 - 1 .6% 100 70%
1980 8,698 2.73 23,742 8,917 24,340 -8.5% 102.52%
1981 8,396 2.59 21,740 8,646 22,387 -8.0% 102.98%
1982 8,668 2.36 20,459 8,966 21,162 -5.5% 103.44%
1983 9,825 2.10 20,622 10,152 21,308 0.7% 103.33%
1984 11,323 1.87 21,155 11,657 21,779 2.2% 102.95%
1985 14,039 1.56 21,837 14,331 22,291 2.4% 102.08%
1986 19,197 1.14 21,858 19,763 22,502 0.9% 102.95%
1987 22,527 1 22,527 23,141 23,141 2.8% 102.73%
1988 26,763 0.86 23,054 27,366 23,573 1.9% 102.25%
1989 31,624 0.74 23,361 32,230 23,809 1.0% 101.92%
1990 40,359 0.60 24,133 41,058 24,551 3.1% 101.73%
1991 47,048 0.53 25,111 47,792 25,508 3.9% 101.58%
1992 54,316 0.49 26,364 54,766 26,582 4.2% 100.83%
Source: World Tables 1994, World Bank, pp. 153,252.
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Coffee 148,305 2,413.9 358 94,700 2,413.9 228.6
Cotton 231 1,300.0 0.3 538 1,300.0 0.7
Sugar 42,667 450.0 19.2 30,000 450.0 13.5
Shrimps 3,433 4,660.0 16 2,146 4,660.0 10
No Traditional (CACM) 111,840 1,250.0 139.8 128,480 1,250.0 160.6
No Traditional (ROW) 60,400 1,250.0 75.5 67,280 1,250.0 84.1
Total 366,876 11,324 608.8 323,144 11,323.9 497.5
Imports:
Food 485,095 324.6 157.5 413,711 374.6 155.0
Industrial goods 1,436,490 590.0 847.5 1,497,106 669.2 1,001.9









Coffee 148,663 1,741.5 258.9 127,466 1,722.0 219.5
Cotton 997 1,304.4 1.3 452 1,550.0 0.7
Sugar 44,912 452.0 20.3 82,051 390.0 32
Shrimps 3,069 4,660.0 14.3 3,179 6,260.0 19.9
No Traditional (CACM) 138,733 1,247.0 173 155,520 1,245.5 193.7
No Traditional (ROW) 90,136 1,247.0 112.4 98,113 1245.5 122.2
Total 426,509 10,652 580 466,781 12,413 588
Imports:
Food 454,972 387.4 176.2 788,009 297.9 234.7
Industrial goods 1,904,916 570.2 1,086.2 1,713,259 685.7 1,174.8










Coffee 120,290 121,900 147,200 143,704
Cotton 9,936 7,084 4,968 3,772











United States 238.60 178.50 194.55 196.93
Mexico 1.50 3.39 4.62 8.13
Germany 140.64 88.50 91.16 76.10
Guatemala 91.90 102.57 100.68 108.30
Japan 27.58 14.68 6.16 15.70
ROW 108.62 109.80 185.09 183.21
Total 608.84 497.45 582.26 588.36
Imports:
United States 376.98 461.73 537.21 558.46
Mexico 80.36 96.29 97.71 118.49
Germany 43.38 54.66 55.54 59.85
Guatemala 133.26 130.04 145.42 164.30
Japan 50.02 49.18 44.47 68.44
ROW 322.90 369.45 382.11 426.45
Total 1,006.90 1,161.34 1,262.46 1,395.99
Trade Balance -398.06 -663.89 -680.20 -807.63
Partial T/B:
United States -138.38 -283.23 -342.66 -361.54
Mexico -78.86 -92.89 -93.09 -110.36
Germany 97.26 33.84 35.62 16.25
Guatemala -41.36 -27.46 -44.74 -56.00
Japan -22.44 -34.50 -38.32 -52.74
ROW -214.28 -259.64 -197.01 -243.24
Trade Incidents
United States 34.76% 42.66% 50.38% 44.77%
Mexico 19.81% 13.99% 13.69% 13.67%
Germany -24.43% -5.10% -5.24% -2.01%
Guatemala 10.39% 4.14% 6.58% 6.93%
Japan 5.64% 5.20% 5.63% 6.53%
ROW 53.83% 39.11% 28.96% 30.12%











United States 39.19 35.88 33.41 33.47
Mexico 0.25 0.68 0.79 1.38
Germany 23.10 17.79 15.66 12.93
Guatemala 15.09 20.62 17.29 18.41
Japan 4.53 2.95 1.06 2.67
ROW 17.84 22.07 31.79 31.14
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Imports:
United States 37.44 39.76 42.55 40
Mexico 7.98 8.29 7.74 8.49
Germany 4.31 4.71 4.40 4.29
Guatemala 13.23 11.2 11.52 11.77
Japan 4.97 4.23 3.52 4.9
ROW 32.07 31.81 30.27 30.55
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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1978 2.50 3.50 4.25 1.21
1979 5.00 5.50 5.20 0.22 0.95 -0.22
1980 5.00 5.50 5.20 0.95
1981 5.00 5.60 5.20 0.93
1982 5.00 5.60 5.20 0.93
1983 5.00 5.30 5.20 0.98
1984 5.00 5.30 5.20 0.98
1985 5.00 5.30 5.20 0.98
1986 5.00 7.50 8.00 0.54 1.07 0.09
1987 5.00 7.50 8.00 1.07
1988 5.00 7.50 10.00 0.25 1.33 0.25
1989 5.60 7.50 10.00 1.33
1990 7.60 8.25 11.50 0.15 1.39 0.05
1991 8.00 8.55 13.00 0.13 1.52 0.09
1992 8.50 8.46 13.00 1.54
1993 8.78 8.77 14.00 0.03 1.60 0.04
1994 8.78 8.78 16.50 0.18 1.88 0.18
1995 8.78 8.78 16.50 1.88
-
Source: El Salvador Ministry of Planning, Economic, and Social Indicators.
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Economic Activity 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Agricultural
Sector
General Rate 5.2 5.2 5.2 8 8 10 10 11.5 13 13





PerArroba 2.85 2.85 2.85 2.85 2.85 3.25 3.25 3.9 3.9 3.9
Per Day 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 16.3 16.3 19.5 19.5 19.5
Sugar
Per Ton 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.75 6.75 8.1 8.1 8.1
Per Day 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 13.5 13.5 16.2 16.2 16.2
Cotton
PerPound 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14




Coffee Plants 14 14 14 14 14 17 17 20.4 20.4 20.4
Sugar Refineries 8 8 8 8 8 11 11 13.2 13.2 13.2
Cotton Plants 8 8 8 8 8 11 11 13.2 13.2 13.2
Manufacturing
and Services
Metropolitan Zone 11 13 13 15 15 18 18 21 23.5 27
Other 10 11.9 11.9 14 14 17 17 20 22.5 26
Municipalities
Note: The salaries are related to an 8 hour work day (40 hour work week). An arroba is equivalent
to 25 pounds.
Source: Salvadoran Ministry of Labor and Welfare.
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APPENDIX F. TURNOVER IN SALVADORAN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
Level of Education 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1 st Grade
Enrollment 229.2 229.4 239.6 245.5 238.4 237.5 236.7 214.8 217.3
Graduated 152 158.2 165 167 162.4 158.3 148 153.1
Turnover 34% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33% 37% 29%
2nd Grade
Enrollment 141.8 152 158.2 165 167 162.4 158.3 148 153.1
Graduated 119.1 130.7 137.5 138.4 136.6 134.7 127.5 133.1
Turnover 16% 14% 13% 16% 18% 17% 19% 10%
3rd Grade
Enrollment 110.7 119.1 130.7 137.5 138.4 136.6 134.7 127.5 133.1
Graduated 95.4 105.4 115.4 117.7 118.1 118.5 110.3 121.5
Turnover 14% 12% 12% 14% 15% 13% 18% 5%
4th Grade
Enrollment 84.2 95.4 105.4 115.4 117.7 118.1 118.5 110.3 121.5
Graduated 72.3 84.1 92.6 97.2 98.7 100.2 96.3 100.4
Turnover 14% 12% 12% 16% 16% 15% 19% 9%
5th Grade
Enrollment 71.8 72.3 84.1 92.6 97.2 98.7 100.2 96.3 100.4
Graduated 61.8 64.3 74.9 80.3 82.5 84.7 82.7 89.4
Turnover 14% 11% 11% 13% 15% 14% 17% 7%
6th Grade
Enrollment 63 61.8 64.3 74.9 80.3 82.5 84.7 82.7 89.4
Graduated 59.2 60.2 63.5 69.3 71.2 72.9 71.9 74.8
Turnover 6% 3% 1% 7% 11% 12% 15% 10%
7 th Grade
Enrollment 58.6 59.2 60.2 63.5 69.3 71.2 72.9 71.9 74.8
Graduated 49.8 51.3 54.6 55.1 57.3 59.6 60.8 62.9
Turnover 15% 13% 9% 13% 17% 16% 17% 13%
8th Grade
Enrollment 49.8 49.8 51.3 54.6 55.1 57.3 59.6 60.8 62.9
Graduated 44.2 46.2 48.8 48.9 49.6 50.4 51.8 54.9
Turnover 11% 7% 5% 10% 10% 12% 13% 10%
9th Grade




Level of Education 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19X8 1989 1990 1991
1st Grade
Enrollment 116.7 122.9 130.5 133.9 131.4 133.2 135 120.8 122.6
Graduated 74.9 80.1 82.1 85.1 83.3 81.6 74.9 78
Turnover 36% 35% 37% 36% 37% 39% 45% 35%
2nd Grade
Enrollment 64.4 74.9 80.1 82.1 85.1 83.3 81.6 74.9 78
Graduated 50.3 57.4 61.2 60.9 61.3 61.6 57.9 59.9
Turnover 22% 23% 24% 26% 28% 26% 29% 20%
3rd Grade
Enrollment 43.2 50.3 57.4 61.2 60.9 61.3 61.6 57.9 59.9
Graduated 35.7 40.6 45.1 37.7 48.4 49.1 45 47
Turnover 17% 19% 21% 38% 21% 20% 27% 19%
4th Grade
Enrollment 30.2 35.7 40.6 45.1 37.7 48.4 49.1 45 47
Graduated 24.1 28 30.8 33.2 34.8 36.4 34.2 35.9
Turnover 20% 22% 24% 26% 8% 25% 30% 20%
5th Grade
Enrollment 23 24.1 28 30.8 33.2 34.8 36.4 34.2 35.9
Graduated 18.8 19.1 22.1 24.2 26.1 27.9 26.6 28.6
Turnover 18% 21% 21% 21% 21% 20% 27% 16%
6th Grade
Enrollment 18.6 18.8 19.1 22.1 24.2 26.1 27.9 26.6 28.6
Graduated 11.5 11.8 11.5 13.2 14.5 16.1 16.2 17.8
Turnover 38% 37% 40% 40% 40% 38% 42% 33%
7th Grade
Enrollment 11 11.5 11.8 11.5 13.2 14.5 16.1 16.2 17.8
Graduated 8.7 8.9 8.9 9.4 10.4 11.3 12 13.4
Turnover 21% 23% 25% 18% 21% 22% 25% 17%
8th Grade
Enrollment 8.4 8.7 8.9 8.9 9.4 10.4 11.3 12 13.4
Graduated 6.7 7.3 7.1 7.4 8 8.6 8.9 10.4
Turnover 20% 16% 20% 17% 15% 17% 21% 13%
9th Grade





Courses 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1 st Course
Enrollment 17,186 17,340 18,253 18,246 19,438 19,103 16,737 14,293
Graduated 15,829 15,059 16,159 16,231 15,834 14,480 12,630
Turnover 8% 13% 11% 11% 19% 24% 25%
2nd Course
Enrollment 13,077 15,829 15,059 16,159 16,231 15,834 14,480 12630
Graduated 12,444 12,890 13,821 15,075 14,121 12,744 11,828
Turnover 5% 19% 8% 7% 13% 20% 18%
3rd Course




1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Enrollment 10,433 9,775 9,590 7,926 7,949 5,923 5,651 5,802
Universities
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
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